GR 48940; (June, 1943) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48940 ; June 22, 1943
MATEO MADDAMMU, petitioner, vs. JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, Fifth Judicial District, NICASIO SANCHEZ, and the SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
FACTS
On January 8, 1943, respondent Nicasio Sanchez filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Manila against petitioner Mateo Maddammu. Sanchez alleged that on or before December 5, 1942, he bought a house from Alejandro Calipayan and Maura Manalo. However, before Sanchez could take possession, Maddammu “surreptitiously and maliciously occupied” the house without Sanchez’s knowledge or consent. Sanchez prayed for alternative reliefs: (a) delivery of possession of the house; (b) permission to remove the house from Maddammu’s lot; or (c) payment by Maddammu of the house’s reasonable value (P150). After trial, the respondent court rendered judgment declaring Sanchez the owner of the house by virtue of the sales contract and, by virtue of his ownership, entitled to its possession. The court ordered Maddammu to vacate the house, allow its removal, and pay consequential damages of P12 per month from December 5, 1942. Upon Sanchez’s motion, the court allowed a writ of immediate execution. Maddammu opposed the writ and instituted this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE
Whether the Municipal Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the action filed by Nicasio Sanchez.
RULING
No, the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the case. The complaint purported to be one for forcible entry, but the facts alleged failed to establish such an action. In forcible entry cases under Rule 72, Section 1, the sole issue is physical possession (possession de facto) of real property. Jurisdiction requires an allegation of the plaintiff’s (or his vendors’) prior physical possession and deprivation thereof by the defendant through the means specified in the Rule. The complaint contained no such allegation. Instead, it explicitly stated that “before plaintiff could take possession of and occupy said house, defendant surreptitiously and maliciously occupied same,” which conclusively shows Sanchez had no prior physical possession. There was also no allegation, express or implied, regarding the vendors’ prior physical possession. Consequently, the jurisdictional requirement was not met. Sanchez’s action was fundamentally based on his claim of ownership derived from a deed of conveyance, and the alternative reliefs he sought were predicated on that right of ownership. Therefore, the respondent court acted without jurisdiction, rendering all its proceedings, including the judgment and the writ of execution, null and void. The writ of execution and the judgment were set aside.