G.R. No. 48796; March 17, 1943
Linda Mohamed Barrueco, represented by her guardian ad litem, Ciriaca Sulayao, plaintiff-appellant, vs. The Consul General of Spain in the Philippines, in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Julio Veloso Barrueco, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The plaintiff-appellant, Linda Mohamed Barrueco, a baby girl, through her guardian ad litem, filed an action to compel the defendant-appellee, as administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco, to recognize her as his natural daughter. Previously, the same plaintiff had filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of Julio Veloso Barrueco to be declared his sole universal heir, which was denied by Judge Gervasio Diaz. The uncontroverted facts, as found by Judge Diaz, are: From May 22, 1937, until June 12, 1939, the deceased Julio Veloso Barrueco and Gliceria Mohamed, then a minor, lived together openly as husband and wife, both being single and without impediment to marry. As a result of their relations, Linda Mohamed Barrueco was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital on the night of June 9, 1939. Julio Veloso Barrueco drove Gliceria Mohamed to the hospital that night. He paid her hospitalization expenses, constantly expressed his desire that the child be baptized with his name if it were a boy, and, when visited by a friend on June 10, 1939, asked if she had seen his daughter Linda. Julio Veloso Barrueco died from mortal wounds inflicted on the night of Linda’s birth, passing away on June 12, 1939, three days after her birth. The trial court (Judge Fernando Jugo) dismissed the complaint on two grounds: (1) the decision of Judge Diaz had rendered the issue of compulsory recognition res adjudicata, and (2) the proven facts did not entitle the plaintiff to recognition under Article 135 of the Civil Code, as the child’s possession of the status of a natural child was not uninterrupted due to the father’s death three days after her birth.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for compulsory recognition.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The Court held that both the parties and the trial court overlooked a vital procedural aspect: in an action to compel recognition of a natural child of a deceased person, the legitimate heirs or kin of the deceased are necessary and indispensable parties. Neither in the previous nor in the present case were these potential heirs made parties. Therefore, no valid judgment on the child’s status could be rendered, and the status remains in open question until these necessary parties are given an opportunity to be heard.
On the substantive issue, for the future guidance of the trial court, the Supreme Court expressed its opinion that the lower court’s interpretation was erroneous. The Court held that under Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code, a conceived child is considered as born for all purposes favorable to it, provided it is born with a human form and lives twenty-four hours after complete separation from the mother’s womb. Since the plaintiff fulfilled this requisite, the acts performed by the putative father from the time of conception—such as their open marital cohabitation, his bringing the mother to the hospital, paying expenses, expressing his wish to name the child, and inquiring about his daughter—constituted sufficient acts justifying the plaintiff’s uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child from conception until the father’s death. The fact that the father died three days after the child’s birth did not negate this uninterrupted possession.
The case was ordered remanded to the trial court with instructions to include the legitimate heirs or kin of the deceased as parties defendant, after which the case shall be retried and decided anew. No costs were awarded.