G.R. No. 48753; August 31, 1942
ANDREA CORDOVA VDA. DE MAÑALAC, ETC., petitioner, vs. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, ETC., ANA MAÑALAC, and LAUREANO MAÑALAC, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Andrea Cordova Vda. de Mañalac, as heir and administratrix of her deceased husband Laureano Mañalac’s estate, filed a petition in the probate court on September 10, 1940, praying for the inclusion of the properties “La Joyeria El Diamante” and “La Agencia El Diamante” in the inventory of the estate. Respondents Ana Mañalac and Laureano Mañalac, Jr., also heirs of the deceased, opposed the petition. On September 2, 1941, the probate court issued a resolution declaring, among other things, that the said properties did not belong to the conjugal partnership of the deceased and the petitioner. Notice of this resolution was served on September 3, 1941. On September 11, 1941, respondent Ana Mañalac moved for reconsideration, praying that the declaration regarding the ownership of the properties be included in the dispositive part of the resolution. The court denied this motion on September 23, 1941, ruling that the declaration in the resolution’s body could be considered part of the dispositive portion. Notice of this denial was served on September 24, 1941. On October 8, 1941, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of both the September 2 resolution and the September 23 order, arguing that any finding on ownership was beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction. The court denied this motion on October 18, 1941, holding that the petitioner’s earlier motion did not suspend the appeal period and that the September 2 resolution had become final. The petitioner then instituted this certiorari proceeding, seeking to have the probate court’s finding on ownership declared null and void for excess of jurisdiction or, alternatively, to have the resolution declared not final.

ISSUE

1. Whether the probate court had jurisdiction to render a resolution declaring that the properties “La Joyeria El Diamante” and “La Agencia El Diamante” did not belong to the conjugal partnership.
2. Whether the said resolution of September 2, 1941, had become final and executory.

RULING

1. On Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the resolution of September 2, 1941, was valid and within the probate court’s jurisdiction. While, as a general rule, a probate court cannot pass upon questions of title to property, an exception exists when all interested parties are heirs and they submit the question to the probate court. In such cases, the court may definitively adjudicate the matter because questions of collation or advancement are often involved, which are proper for administration proceedings. In this case, all parties were heirs, and the question of ownership was submitted by the petitioner herself through her motion for inclusion in the inventory. Therefore, she cannot complain if the court, after examining the evidence, decided against her.
2. On Finality of the Resolution: The Supreme Court held that the resolution of September 2, 1941, had not yet become final, thereby allowing the petitioner to perfect an appeal. The Court reasoned that the dispositive part of the September 2 resolution did not contain any declaration regarding the two properties. It was only through the order of September 23, 1941 (denying Ana Mañalac’s motion for reconsideration), that the court’s statement on ownership in the resolution’s body was effectively made part of the dispositive portion. Notice of this September 23 order was served on September 24, 1941. The period for appeal began to run from this latter date. When the petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration on October 8, 1941, only 14 days of the 30-day appeal period had elapsed. The subsequent order of October 18, 1941, declaring the resolution final, was treated as a virtual refusal to allow an appeal. Consequently, the petitioner still had 16 days remaining to perfect her appeal from the date the Supreme Court’s judgment became final.
DISPOSITIVE:
The resolution of the probate court dated September 2, 1941, is declared valid but not final. The petitioner is permitted to appeal therefrom within 16 days after this Supreme Court judgment becomes final. No costs.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Paras concurred in the result but dissented in part. He argued that the petitioner, by not appealing or seeking clarification after the September 2 resolution, must be deemed to have agreed with it. He contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Ana Mañalac did not suspend the appeal period for the petitioner, as it sought a result contrary to the petitioner’s interest. Furthermore, he expressed the view that orders regarding the inclusion or exclusion of property from an inventory are provisional and interlocutory, and thus not appealable.