GR 48519 22; (June, 1942) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48519 -22; June 12, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FIDEL FORTUNO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
The defendant-appellant, Fidel Fortuno, was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila upon appeal from the Municipal Court for four separate offenses of estafa. He was sentenced to imprisonment for two months and one day of arresto mayor in one case ( G.R. No. 48519 ) and for three months and eleven days of arresto mayor in each of the other three cases, along with indemnification and costs. The appellant pleaded guilty in the Municipal Court for the case corresponding to G.R. No. 48519 but pleaded not guilty in the Municipal Court for the other three cases. However, upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, he pleaded guilty in all four cases. The case is before the Supreme Court in third instance, and appellant’s counsel de oficio did not assign any errors in the appealed judgments.
ISSUE
Whether the appellant’s plea of guilty made upon appeal in the Court of First Instance can be considered a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, subsection 7 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court, through the majority opinion, affirmed the judgments of the lower court and held that a plea of guilty entered for the first time upon appeal in the Court of First Instance cannot be considered a mitigating circumstance. The Court reiterated the settled rule established in previous cases (People vs. Hermino, People vs. Bawasanta, People vs. Javier, People vs. Cariaga, People vs. Jose y Payumo). The reasons advanced are:
1. The mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty is based on repentance and a moral disposition favorable to reform, which encourages the accused to spare the government the expense and trouble of a trial. Such repentance cannot be attributed to an appellant who did not plead guilty in the court of origin (Municipal Court) but instead appealed successively to the Court of First Instance and the Supreme Court.
2. A contrary rule would allow defendants to intentionally abstain from pleading guilty in the Municipal Court, hoping for acquittal, and then plead guilty on appeal merely to avail of the mitigating circumstance, thereby lacking the spontaneous willingness the law rewards.
3. While a trial de novo in the Court of First Instance technically means a trial as if originally instituted there, it does not erase the proceedings in the lower court to the extent of precluding an ascertainment of whether the defendant voluntarily pleaded guilty to determine the presence of the mitigating circumstance. The proceedings in the Municipal Court are not completely vacated for this purpose.
The Court also addressed the application of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code regarding the service of multiple penalties but found it inapplicable at present, subject to future calculations under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Bocobo):
Justice Bocobo dissented, arguing that the appellant’s plea of guilty in the Court of First Instance should be considered a mitigating circumstance. His reasons are:
1. Rule 119, section 8 of the Rules of Court (formerly section 2473 of the Revised Administrative Code) provides that upon appeal, all proceedings and judgment of the municipal court are vacated, and the case shall be tried anew in the Court of First Instance as if originally instituted there. Therefore, the proceedings in the Municipal Court should be disregarded, and only the plea in the Court of First Instance should be considered.
2. Article 13, subsection 7 of the Revised Penal Code refers to a confession of guilt “before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.” This evidence is that which would have been offered in the Court of First Instance, not in the Municipal Court, since the latter’s proceedings are vacated.
3. The objective of rewarding the accused for sparing the government trouble and expense of a trial was attained for the trial in the Court of First Instance.
4. The requirement that the confession be made at the first opportunity is not always practical, as an accused may be wrongly advised initially. The law should be liberally construed in favor of the accused to encourage confession and human amelioration.
Justice Bocobo concluded that the confession of guilt should be a mitigating circumstance in all four cases, reducing the penalty in each to two months and one day of arresto mayor.