GR 224825; (October, 2018) (Digest)
March 13, 2026GR L 18476; (May, 1964) (Digest)
March 13, 2026G.R. No. L-48510 October 17, 1980
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR and STANDARD (PHIL.) FRUIT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
The Associated Labor Unions (ALU) filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court on September 5, 1978. The petition sought to assail the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated May 12, 1978, which had dismissed ALU’s complaint for additional compensation corresponding to the waiting or assembly time of workers at Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation. The union’s complaint was rooted in the claim that such assembly time constituted “time-worked” and should therefore be compensable as working time. Prior to the Secretary’s decision, the National Labor Relations Commission had ruled in favor of the union, holding the assembly time to be compensable. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition, and the parties subsequently filed their memoranda, with the case being submitted for decision on August 22, 1979.
However, before the Supreme Court could render a judgment on the merits, the petitioner union filed a motion on September 16, 1979. This motion prayed for the withdrawal of its petition and the dismissal of the case. The basis for this motion was that the parties—the Associated Labor Unions and Standard (Phil.) Fruit Corporation—had successfully arrived at a compromise agreement dated September 8, 1980. A key condition stipulated within this compromise agreement was the express requirement for the union to withdraw its appeal, which referred to its pending petition in this very case, G.R. No. L-48510.
ISSUE
Whether the Supreme Court should grant the motion to withdraw the petition and dismiss the case based on the compromise agreement reached by the parties.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The legal logic is straightforward and hinges on the fundamental principle of party autonomy and the judicial policy favoring amicable settlements. When litigants voluntarily enter into a compromise agreement to settle their dispute, the courts generally respect and give effect to such agreement, as it signifies the parties’ mutual desire to terminate the litigation. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Its validity and binding effect, once executed, are recognized under the Civil Code.
In this instance, the compromise agreement, executed on September 8, 1980, contained the specific condition that the union withdraw its petition. By filing the motion to withdraw, the petitioner was merely fulfilling its contractual obligation under the settlement. The Court’s role is not to unnecessarily prolong adjudication when the parties themselves have resolved their conflict extra-judicially. Dismissing the case upon joint motion or upon a showing of settlement promotes the efficient administration of justice, obviates the need for further judicial resources, and honors the parties’ own resolution. Consequently, the Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of the petition, considering the case closed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

