G.R. No. 48322; October 16, 1941
EUGENIO SAWIT, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SOTERO RODAS, ETC., and YSIDRA COJUANGCO, respondents.

FACTS

On March 21, 1938, petitioners filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to review a land registration decree issued on September 10, 1937, in favor of respondent Ysidra Cojuangco, alleging fraud. On January 31, 1941, Judge Concepcion denied the petition to reopen, finding no fraud. Petitioners’ attorney was notified of this order on February 17, 1941. On the same day, the attorney filed two separate motions: a “Motion for Reconsideration” (set for hearing on March 10, 1941) and a “Motion for New Trial” (set for hearing on March 17, 1941), both attacking the January 31 order on the grounds it was contrary to law and evidence. The motion for new trial incorporated by reference the arguments from the motion for reconsideration. On March 10, 1941, Judge Pablo denied the motion for reconsideration. The motion for new trial was heard on March 17, 1941, but according to petitioners, no order granting or denying it had been entered by the time they filed the present certiorari petition on May 14, 1941. Respondents claimed it was denied orally on March 17. Petitioners did not appeal the January 31 order. On April 8, 1941, respondents filed a motion to declare the January 31 order final, which Judge Rodas granted on April 17, 1941. After motions for reconsideration of this order were denied, petitioners filed this certiorari proceeding, seeking to nullify the April 17 order and ultimately to have the decree reopened.

ISSUE

1. Whether the extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be used to revise and reverse the trial court’s order of January 31, 1941, denying the petition for review of the decree.
2. Whether the order of Judge Rodas dated April 17, 1941, declaring the January 31 order final, is valid.

RULING

1. No. The principal objective of the certiorari proceeding—to reverse the January 31, 1941, order denying the petition for review—is not permissible. The ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be supplanted by certiorari. Whether the order is final or still appealable, certiorari is not the proper remedy to review it.
2. The order of April 17, 1941, declaring the January 31 order final, was unnecessary but its validity is immaterial to the disposition. The Court found a series of procedural errors. It was error for petitioners’ counsel to file two separate motions (reconsideration and new trial) for the same purpose on the same day, setting them for different hearings; this was superfluous and trifled with the court. The so-called motion for new trial was improper as there had been no trial on the petition to revise the decree; the motion for reconsideration was the proper pleading. The motion for new trial, being superfluous and improper, produced no legal effect and did not suspend the time for appeal. The January 31 order became final by operation of law (ipso jure) thirty days from notice, deducting the period during the pendency of the proper motion for reconsideration. An order becomes final by law, not by judicial declaration. Therefore, the writ of certiorari is denied and the petition is dismissed.