GR 48224; (September, 1942) (Digest)
G.R. No. 48224; September 23, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff. NATIVIDAD FLORENDO, complaint-appellant, vs. GENEROSO MACEDA and CORAZON MACEDA, defendants-appellees.
FACTS
A criminal action for slight slander was filed in the justice of the peace court of Pasig, Rizal, against defendants Generoso Maceda and Corazon Maceda. The offense was allegedly committed on July 21, 1940, and the complaint was filed on October 22, 1940, which is three months and one day after the alleged commission. The case was dismissed on the ground that the offense had already prescribed. The private prosecutor appealed to the Court of First Instance, which also dismissed the appeal on the same ground upon motion of the fiscal. The complainant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether the offended party may appeal from the order of dismissal rendered upon petition of the fiscal.
2. Whether the offense of slight slander had prescribed.
RULING
1. On the Right to Appeal: The Supreme Court held that the offended party may, as of right, intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but only when, from the nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action for civil liability has not been waived or expressly reserved. This right of intervention is subject to the prosecution being under the direction and control of the fiscal. The Court ruled that the offended party may appeal upon a question of law, provided there exists a rightful claim to civil indemnity and such action has not been waived or expressly reserved. In this case, since the civil action for damages arising from the oral defamation charged was not waived or expressly reserved, and it is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the offended party may rightly intervene by appealing the order of dismissal on a question of law.
2. On Prescription: The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. Applying Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two months. The offense charged, slight slander, is a light offense. Since the complaint was filed three months and one day after the alleged commission, it was filed beyond the two-month prescriptive period. The Court rejected the contention that all oral defamation, whether light or serious, prescribes in six months, clarifying that the six-month period under Article 90 applies specifically to serious oral defamation and slander by deed, not to light oral defamation, which follows the general rule for light offenses.
DISPOSITIVE:
The order of dismissal is affirmed with costs against appellant.