G.R. No. 48176; July 21, 1944
MARTIN DIOQUINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The plaintiff-appellant, Martin Dioquino, filed a complaint for damages against the defendant-appellee, J. Antonio Araneta. The complaint alleged that on April 6, 1940, in Baguio, the defendant’s chauffeur, Pedro Estrada, through negligence, carelessness, and imprudence, drove the defendant’s automobile and hit the plaintiff while he was pouring water into his employer’s parked car. The plaintiff suffered a broken kneecap, was hospitalized, and claimed to have become permanently disabled from performing his ordinary work, which previously earned him P35 a month. The plaintiff sought P10,000 in damages, specifically alleging that the defendant “did not use and exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his said chauffeur.” The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action. The Court of First Instance of Manila granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the complaint states a cause of action against the defendant-employer under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code, given that the defendant is not alleged to be the owner or director of an establishment or business.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint. The complaint does not state a cause of action against the defendant.
1. Application of Article 1902: Article 1902, which establishes liability for one’s own fault or negligence, is not applicable against the defendant. Even assuming the allegation that he failed to exercise due diligence in selecting his chauffeur is true, such failure was not the proximate cause of the damage. The article would be applicable only against the chauffeur himself, who directly committed the negligent act.
2. Application of Article 1903: The action, predicated on Article 1903 (vicarious liability), also fails. Article 1903 specifically enumerates the persons liable for the acts of others (e.g., parents, guardians, owners/directors of establishments, the State under certain conditions, teachers). The defendant’s chauffeur does not fall within this list of persons for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. Crucially, the complaint does not allege that the defendant is the “owner or director of an establishment or business” and that the chauffeur was engaged in such business at the time of the accident. Following the established jurisprudence in Johnson vs. David and Chapman vs. Underwood, the driver is not among the persons enumerated in Article 1903.
3. Stare Decisis and Legislative Prerogative: The Court declined to overturn its prior interpretation of the codal provisions, stating that to interpret them to include persons other than those specifically enumerated would be an invasion of legislative power. The legislature, aware of the Court’s interpretation since 1914 (Chapman), had not seen fit to amend the law for nearly three decades.
Separate Opinion (Dissent):
Justice Bocobo, with whom Justice Paras concurred, dissented, arguing for liability based on the following:
* The first paragraph of Article 1903 establishes a general principle of responsibility for persons one is bound to answer for. The subsequent enumeration creates presumptions of negligence for specific relationships but does not exempt others who are actually negligent.
* Since the complaint specifically alleged the defendant’s negligence in selecting his chauffeur and in failing to prevent the damage (allegations admitted by the motion to dismiss), the defendant should be held liable under this general principle, even if not presumed negligent.
The Johnson and Chapman* cases are distinguishable because in those cases, there was no proof of the defendant’s actual negligence, whereas here, negligence is alleged.
* The defendant, as the owner of the automobile, should also be liable under Articles 1905-1910 of the Civil Code concerning liability for damages caused by things.
* The Court should apply principles of analogy, progressive interpretation, and construction favoring a natural right (compensation for the crippled plaintiff), and should not feel constrained from administering justice by a rigid reading of the enumeration in Article 1903.