G.R. No. 48100; June 20, 1941
FLORENCIO PELOBELLO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GREGORIO PALATINO, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

The petitioner-appellant, Florencio Pelobello, instituted quo warranto proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against the respondent-appellee, Gregorio Palatino, the mayor-elect of the municipality of Torrijos, Province of Marinduque. It was alleged that the respondent-appellee was disqualified from holding office because he had been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of “atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes” and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four months and one day of prision correccional, a disqualification not removed by plenary pardon. The fact of conviction and the election and proclamation of the respondent-appellee as mayor are admitted. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted a conditional pardon by the Governor-General in 1915. It was proven that on December 25, 1940, the President of the Philippines granted the respondent-appellee an absolute pardon, restoring him to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights. This absolute pardon was granted after the election in December 1940 but before the date fixed by law for assuming office.

ISSUE

Whether or not the absolute pardon granted to the respondent-appellee after his election but before the date fixed for assuming office had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction under paragraph (a) of section 94 of the Election Code.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Adopting the view expressed in Cristobal vs. Labrador, the Court held that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. Subject to constitutional limitations, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, an absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction. The Court found that the respondent had committed the offense more than 25 years prior, had received a conditional pardon in 1915, had subsequently exercised the right of suffrage, and had been elected to various municipal positions. The purpose of the absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will, and it was granted before the date fixed for assuming office. The Court saw no reason to defeat this purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation and therefore gave efficacy to the executive action.