GR 47946; (December, 1942) (Digest)
G.R. No. 47946 , December 28, 1942
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LIM KEE SIU, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Lim Kee Siu was accused of theft in the municipal court of Iloilo City on August 22, 1940. The information was signed and sworn to by the assistant city attorney before Acting Municipal Judge Jose Vicente Mapa, who issued an order of arrest the same day. The trial was held on October 11, 1940, before Auxiliary Municipal Judge Gregorio Jalbuena, as the regular judge, Jose Vicente Mapa, was on leave. Judge Mapa returned to duty on October 16, 1940. However, on October 17, 1940, Auxiliary Judge Jalbuena rendered and signed a decision sentencing the accused. The accused was to appear on October 29, 1940, to be informed of the decision. On that date, upon motion of the accused’s attorney, the regular judge, Jose Vicente Mapa, declared the auxiliary judge’s decision invalid because the regular incumbent had returned to duty the day before the decision was rendered. The city attorney appealed. The Court of First Instance, on November 22, 1940, reversed Judge Mapa’s order and remanded the case with instructions to promulgate the decision of Auxiliary Judge Jalbuena dated October 17, 1940.
ISSUE
After the return of the regular municipal judge from leave, did the auxiliary judge retain the power to decide a case that he had tried while the regular judge was absent?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding that the auxiliary judge retained the power to decide the case. The ruling was based on the following reasons:
1. It is an established principle that a judge who obtains jurisdiction retains it until the final disposition of the cause. The right to render judgment is a necessary consequence of the power to hear and try a case, a rule founded on sound public policy to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the administration of justice. The judge who tried the case is in a better position to render a correct judgment.
2. The municipal court of Iloilo City is not a court of record. The regular judge, who did not hear the evidence, would have to either rely on information from the auxiliary judge or hold a new trial. The first option would be unsatisfactory, as the auxiliary judge could not reproduce exact testimony and trial incidents. The second option would cause unnecessary trouble and expense. Such a new trial could not have been contemplated by the lawmaker.
3. The evident purpose of providing for an auxiliary judge was for him to assist the regular incumbent. The appellant’s theory would seriously reduce the auxiliary judge’s usefulness, as many trials would become worthless, thereby defeating the primary objective of the law.
4. The appointment of Auxiliary Judge Gregorio Jalbuena was in full force and effect when he rendered the decision on October 17, 1940. This case is distinguishable from instances where a judge’s appointment has been disapproved, divesting him of all judicial authority.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
