G.R. No. 47848; June 17, 1941
Bonifacio Dangalan, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Domingo Marticio et al., defendants and appellants.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Bonifacio Dangalan, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Albay to recover from the defendants the sum of P584.20, representing the value of salted fish, plus P116 as damages. He alleged that defendant Domingo Marticio was the owner, and Teodoro Bonafe and Juan Babasa were the driver and conductor/loader, respectively, of truck No. 1015; that he had agreed with Marticio for the truck to transport his salted fish from Putiao, Pilar, Sorsogon, to Tabaco, Albay, for a fee of P7; that on December 1, 1936, at kilometer 9 in Libog, Albay, the truck broke down and a storm occurred shortly after; that the next day, while the truck was still stopped and the plaintiff’s agent had gone to look for another vehicle, the driver and conductor abandoned the truck, causing almost the entire cargo to disappear, having been stolen by people; and that the defendants refused to pay despite demand. The case was set for hearing. During the hearing, the plaintiff presented evidence in the absence of the defendants and their counsel, despite the latter having been duly notified. On February 6, 1939, the court rendered judgment, finding the plaintiff had proven the facts alleged, and condemned the defendants jointly and severally to pay the claimed amounts plus costs. On February 9, 1939, the defendants’ counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to set aside the decision. He alleged as grounds that on the date of the hearing he was in Daet, Camarines Norte, to defend an accused in criminal case No. 1264 of the Court of First Instance of that province; that the judge who decided the case had previously granted him permission to be absent from his Justice of the Peace court to attend the hearing of said criminal case; and that before leaving for Daet, he had agreed with the plaintiff’s counsel to postpone the hearing set for February 2 to another date to give him an opportunity to be present with the defendants and present their evidence. The plaintiff’s counsel opposed the motion and categorically denied having agreed with the defendants’ counsel to transfer the hearing. On July 10, 1939, the court issued an order setting aside its decision and reopening the trial for the defendants to present their evidence. The plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of this order, asking that it be set aside, arguing that the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants’ counsel was not under oath nor supported by sworn statements of merit, and that he had not agreed to postpone the hearing. Finding the motion well-founded because the motion filed by the defendants’ counsel was not under oath nor accompanied by sworn statements of merit, and because it found as proven that there was no agreement to postpone the hearing between the parties’ counsel, the court, by another order dated September 19, 1939, set aside its order of July 10, 1939, and declared the decision of February 6, 1939, final. This last order gave rise to the present appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred or gravely abused its discretion in revoking its order of July 10, 1939 (which had set aside the judgment and reopened the trial) and in not granting the defendants an opportunity to present their defense evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed no such error nor abuse of discretion. It reiterated the constant doctrine in this jurisdiction that for a decision to be set aside via a motion for reconsideration, such motion must be accompanied by sworn statements of merit in which the nature of the evidence must be set forth so the court can determine if its acceptance would change the final result of the case. It must likewise be alleged and established prima facie, at least by the petitioner, that the party against whom the decision was rendered has not been guilty of inexcusable negligence (citing Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil. 446; McGrath vs. Del Rosario, 49 Phil. 330; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844). Since the defendants failed to comply with any of these requirements, they had no right to have the decision set aside nor to the reopening of the trial they sought. Therefore, the trial court did not err in issuing the appealed order. The order was affirmed, with costs against the defendants-appellants.