GR 47829; (October, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. 47829; October 8, 1941
SANTIAGO RAMOS, petitioner, vs. PEDRO POBLETE AND JACOBA JARIN, respondents.
FACTS
The respondents, parents of Agripino Poblete, filed an action for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Their son died on January 26, 1937, after an accident while riding as a laborer in a freight truck owned and driven by the petitioner, Santiago Ramos, en route from Silang, Cavite, to Manila. Agripino Poblete noticed a buri sack fall from the truck, shouted for the driver to stop, and, before the truck came to a full stop, got off to retrieve the sack. In doing so, he was caught and run over by the rear right wheel. The petitioner defended the action by claiming (a) the deceased was never his employee, and (b) the death was caused by the deceased’s notorious negligence. The trial court overruled these defenses and awarded compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, finding the deceased was employed as a laborer. The petitioner, without filing a brief in the Supreme Court, sought review of the Court of Appeals’ rulings on (1) the alleged notorious negligence and (2) the alleged non-applicability of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
ISSUE
1. Whether the deceased, Agripino Poblete, was guilty of notorious negligence barring recovery under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
2. Whether the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 1874), and not the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended), should govern the case because the petitioner’s business allegedly had a gross annual income of less than twenty thousand pesos.
RULING
1. On the issue of notorious negligence: The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the deceased was not guilty of notorious negligence. The Court of Appeals held that while Poblete may have been at fault for alighting before the truck fully stopped, his action did not amount to notorious negligence. The truck’s speed had slackened, and in his excitement to recover what he believed was his employer’s property (a commendable, unselfish act), he momentarily forgot the risk. The Workmen’s Compensation Act is social legislation to be liberally construed. The presumption is that a laborer, by instinct of self-preservation, takes precautions to avoid danger unless an intention to end his life is shown. Simple or contributory negligence is not equivalent to the “notorious negligence” required by the Act to bar recovery. Even if the sack belonged to the deceased, his attempt to recover it was a reasonable act done in the course of his employment, analogous to cases where a workman attempts to retrieve a dropped personal item.
2. On the applicable law: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ refusal to allow the petitioner to change his theory and invoke the Employer’s Liability Act. The petitioner raised this contention for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, citing Section 42 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which states that claims against employers with a gross annual income of less than twenty thousand pesos are governed by the Employer’s Liability Act. The petitioner relied on unsupported statements in the trial court’s decision speculating that his business income was below that threshold. The Supreme Court held:
* The issue was not raised in the pleadings, evidence, or appellant’s brief and constituted an impermissible change of theory on appeal.
* The defense of “notorious negligence” was litigated under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The petitioner should have alleged and proved his income level in the trial court if he intended to rely on it as a defense.
* The trial judge’s unsupported statements about the petitioner’s income were entirely beside the point and must be deemed not written.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
