G.R. No. 47663; January 22, 1990
BELSTAR TRANSPORTATION, INC., petitioner, vs. BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., and PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Belstar Transportation, Inc. applied with the Board of Transportation (BOT) for a Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a bus service from Cabanatuan City to Cubao, Quezon City. After several hearings where Belstar presented evidence of public need, the BOT granted it a provisional authority to operate 16 units. The main application proceeded, with hearings scheduled to address remaining issues, including Belstar’s financial capacity. On September 8, 1977, Belstar’s counsel failed to appear, sending an associate who requested a postponement and agreed to a new hearing date of September 22, 1977, which was explicitly declared “intransferable.” Despite this, Belstar’s counsel filed an urgent motion three days before the September 22 hearing, seeking another postponement due to a conflicting hearing in another court. Oppositor Baliwag Transit, Inc. objected, noting Belstar’s counsel had sought numerous prior postponements and had still not presented evidence on financial capacity.

ISSUE

Whether the Board of Transportation committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for postponement and subsequently dismissing Belstar’s application and revoking its provisional authority.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the BOT’s orders. The Court emphasized that the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is discretionary on the part of the court or quasi-judicial body. This discretion will not be disturbed on review absent a showing of grave abuse. The BOT did not commit such abuse. The record showed petitioner’s counsel had sought postponements on multiple prior occasions. Crucially, on September 8, his authorized associate specifically agreed to the September 22 date and its intransferable character. Allowing another postponement after this agreement would have undermined the BOT’s control over its proceedings and prejudiced the orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, the dismissal was not based solely on the failure to appear. The BOT’s order cited other substantive grounds, including Belstar’s alleged operation of only two or three units despite its provisional authority for sixteen, and serious doubts regarding its financial capacity raised by oppositors. These doubts pertained to the validity of a chattel mortgage for bus purchases and the adequacy of Belstar’s paid-up capital. Petitioner had been given ample opportunity to rebut these but failed to present evidence on its financial standing. Thus, the BOT acted within its sound discretion.