G.R. No. 47616 & G.R. No. 47623; September 16, 1947
Case Parties/Title:

JOSE TAN CHONG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondent-appellant. (G.R. No. 47616)
LAM SWEE SANG, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant. (G.R. No. 47623)

FACTS

1. On October 15, 1941, the Supreme Court promulgated two decisions:
In G.R. No. 47616 (Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor*), the Court affirmed a lower court’s grant of a writ of habeas corpus to Jose Tan Chong, holding he was a Philippine citizen because he was a native-born child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
In G.R. No. 47623 (Lam Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth*), the Court dismissed Lam Swee Sang’s petition for naturalization, holding that as a child born in Sulu to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, he was already a Philippine citizen, making naturalization unnecessary.
2. On October 21, 1941, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration in both cases, arguing that such children were not Philippine citizens under the laws in force at their birth. The motion was pending when World War II broke out, and the records were destroyed.
3. The records were reconstituted in 1946, and the Court proceeded to resolve the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether a child born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother (lawfully married) is a citizen of the Philippines under the laws in force at the time of their birth.

RULING

The Supreme Court GRANTED the motion for reconsideration, SET ASIDE its 1941 decisions, and REVERSED the judgments of the lower courts. A person born in the Philippines of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother is NOT a citizen of the Philippines under the laws applicable at the time of their birth.
1. Abandonment of Jus Soli: The Court explicitly abandoned the principle of jus soli (citizenship by place of birth) that it had applied in some prior cases (like Muñoz vs. Collector of Customs and Roa vs. Collector of Customs). It overruled the line of cases that had applied this principle.
2. Governing Law and Principle of Jus Sanguinis: The Court held that the governing principle is jus sanguinis (citizenship by blood). A legitimate child follows the citizenship of the father. Since the fathers in these cases were Chinese subjects, their children were also Chinese subjects at birth.
3. Application to Specific Cases:
* For Jose Tan Chong (born in 1915), his Chinese father was not a Spanish subject on the critical date of April 11, 1899, as required by Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to become a Philippine citizen. Therefore, the father remained a Chinese subject. Consequently, Tan Chong, following his father’s nationality, was born a Chinese subject and did not acquire Philippine citizenship at birth.
* For Lam Swee Sang (born in 1900), at the time of his birth, there was no Philippine citizenship law in force following the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States. His father was a Chinese subject, and his mother, upon marriage, acquired her husband’s Chinese nationality. Thus, Lam Swee Sang was born a Chinese subject. He and his parents did not qualify for citizenship under the later Philippine Bill of 1902, as they were not Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899.
4. Conclusion: Neither petitioner qualified as a Philippine citizen under Section 4 of the Philippine Bill. Their first opportunity to become citizens was through the naturalization laws enacted after the Jones Law of 1916.