G.R. No. L-47519. April 30, 1980.
ROBERTO RANTAEL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESA LLAVE, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Roberto Rantael leased an apartment unit from private respondent Teresa Llave under a verbal agreement. In 1973, Llave sought a rental increase, prompting Rantael to file a complaint with the Presidential Action Unit for violation of Presidential Decree No. 20. To settle, the parties executed a written “Agreement on Occupancy of Apartment” dated August 1, 1974. The agreement stipulated occupancy “on a month to month basis, beginning today” and expressly provided that “[u]pon thirty (30) days notice, either party may terminate this agreement.” Subsequently, Llave inquired with the Office of the President regarding her right to terminate the lease under this agreement and was advised that it constituted a lease with a definite period, falling under the exception in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20, thus allowing judicial ejectment.
On February 11, 1975, Llave sent Rantael a notice terminating the lease and demanding he vacate after thirty days. Rantael refused. Llave filed an ejectment suit in the Quezon City Court, which ruled in her favor, ordering Rantael to vacate and pay attorney’s fees. The Court of First Instance affirmed this decision. Rantael then petitioned the Court of Appeals, which dismissed his petition, leading to this appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the “Agreement on Occupancy of Apartment” provides for a definite period, thereby exempting it from the suspension of judicial ejectment under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 20.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court ruled that the lease agreement indeed provided for a definite period. The stipulation “on a month to month basis, beginning today” established a starting point. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines a month as thirty days when no specific calendar month is designated, the Court found the period was fixed at thirty days. This interpretation was consistent with the agreement’s explicit term allowing termination by either party upon thirty days’ notice.
Since the lease was for a definite period, it fell within the express exception provided in Section 4 of P.D. No. 20. This decree generally suspended the lessor’s right to judicially eject a lessee under Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code, but not for leases with a definite period. Therefore, Llave was legally entitled to enforce the termination clause and recover possession of the premises through judicial ejectment upon proper notice. The Court found no merit in Rantael’s claims and upheld the right of Llave, who needed the premises for her son, to terminate the lease upon the period’s expiration. The pending incidental motions regarding execution and consignation were rendered moot by this ruling affirming the ejectment.