G.R. No. 47514; August 6, 1941
EMILIANO LAMPA, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS

Emiliano Lampa and Victor Rivera were charged with frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. They were convicted of said crime and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the judgment, finding that the crime committed was not frustrated murder but serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. It sentenced both to four months and one day of arresto mayor. The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, established that on the day in question, there was a heated exchange between the accused and Brigido Malit regarding a fence erected by the accused near Lampa’s house, which blocked the path to Malit’s father’s house. Malit began destroying the fence. Rivera, to drive Malit away, used a shotgun (Exhibit B). Malit, seeing Rivera armed, retreated into some sugarcane fields. Rivera fired the shotgun at the fence. Unfortunately, one of the pellets, upon hitting a sugarcane post, deviated from its trajectory and struck Malit behind the right ear, causing serious injuries. The appellate court concluded that while there was no clear intent to kill, Rivera acted with reckless imprudence. Emiliano Lampa, not satisfied with the modified decision, filed this petition for certiorari, contending that given the facts found by the Court of Appeals, he should be acquitted, as the reckless act was committed solely by his co-accused Victor Rivera.

ISSUE

Whether Emiliano Lampa is criminally liable for the serious physical injuries caused by the reckless imprudence of his co-accused Victor Rivera.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted Emiliano Lampa. The Court held that Lampa should not be held liable for the reckless act of Victor Rivera, even if it is conceded that Lampa was in Rivera’s company and that the firearm used belonged to Lampa. The Court ruled that it is only in cases of conspiracy, once proven, that an act committed by one conspirator is considered the act of all, provided the act is in furtherance of the common design. In this case, there was no proof that Lampa and Rivera had come to an understanding or agreement before Rivera fired the shotgun to drive away Malit. Lampa did not even expect Rivera to act in that manner. Therefore, there was no unity of purpose or concerted action arising at the moment that would make Lampa responsible for Rivera’s reckless discharge of the firearm. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it declared Lampa guilty and sentenced him for the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Moran dissented. Based on the facts recited in the Court of Appeals’ decision, he found that there was a conspiracy. The facts showed: 1) Lampa ordered the construction of the fence; 2) Lampa was at the scene armed with a revolver and accompanied by Rivera, whom he had armed with a shotgun; and 3) Lampa and Rivera together fired towards the fence to drive away Malit and his companions. These facts demonstrated concerted action, unity of purpose, and a previous agreement, constituting a conspiracy. Therefore, Lampa should be held responsible not only for his own acts but also for those of his companion, Victor Rivera. Justice Moran voted to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.