G.R. No. L-47182-83 October 30, 1978
FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA UTEX), petitioner, vs. CARMELO C. NORIEL as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor; UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS UNION-ALU and UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., respondents.

FACTS

The petitioner, Federation of Free Workers (FFW), filed a petition for a certification election among the employees of Universal Textile Mills, Inc. The Med-Arbiter initially denied the petition, but upon appeal, respondent Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Director Carmelo C. Noriel remanded the case for verification of the supporting signatures. The Med-Arbiter subsequently verified that the petition was supported by 1,070 employees, constituting more than 30% of the bargaining unit, and issued an order on May 3, 1977, calling for a certification election. However, in a later decision dated September 29, 1977, Director Noriel reversed this order. He instead recognized the validity of the existing collective bargaining agreement between the respondent union (UTMWU-ALU) and the company for its first year and directed the parties to renegotiate the benefits for the remaining years, with the renegotiated terms to be ratified by the workers through a secret ballot supervised by the BLR.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent BLR Director committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to order a certification election despite the verified compliance with the 30% signature requirement under Article 258 of the Labor Code.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, finding grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is clear and mandatory. Article 258 of the Labor Code explicitly states that upon verification that a petition is supported by at least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a certification election. The Court emphasized that the statutory language is one of command, leaving no room for discretion once the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied. The BLR Director’s action in deviating from this clear mandate by adopting an alternative procedure for renegotiation and ratification, based on pragmatic considerations, constituted a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Court reiterated its consistent doctrine that where the law is clear, the duty of the judiciary and administrative bodies is simple application, not construction or interpretation. The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the exclusive bargaining representative democratically, a fundamental right that cannot be supplanted by an administrative directive for renegotiation. Therefore, the assailed decision was set aside, and the BLR was ordered to conduct the certification election.