G.R. No. 47075 . February 1, 1941.
JOHN ORESTOFF, solicitante-apelante, vs. EL GOBIERNO DE FILIPINAS, opositor-apelado.

FACTS

On April 13, 1939, John Orestoff filed a petition for naturalization as a Filipino citizen in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Civil Case No. 740). He alleged that he was a Russian citizen, born in Omsk, Russia, on November 1, 1895, but as a non-believer in communism, he considered himself stateless. He first arrived in the Philippines on January 22, 1926, via the “President Madison,” had since been employed and maintained good conduct, and was working as a mechanic at Antamok Mines in Baguio. He claimed to possess all qualifications required under Commonwealth Act No. 2927 (the Naturalization Law) and was not disqualified under said law. He expressed his intention to become a Filipino citizen, recognize the sovereignty of the Philippine government, and renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty. After a hearing, the court denied the petition, and Orestoff appealed. The trial court denied the petition because it was proven during the hearing that Orestoff is deaf-mute and, due to this physical defect, cannot speak English, Spanish, or any native dialect as required by law. His disability was evident during the hearing, as he had to provide written answers to questions posed to him.

ISSUE

Whether a deaf-mute applicant for naturalization, who can write but cannot speak due to his physical condition, satisfies the legal requirement to “speak and write English, Spanish or some native tongue” under Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 2927, as amended.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the trial court’s decision denying the petition for naturalization.
The Court held that the law explicitly requires an applicant to “speak and write” one of the specified languages. The Spanish text uses the verb “hablar,” and the English text uses “to speak.” According to the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy, “hablar” means “to articulate, utter words to make oneself understood.” Webster’s Dictionary defines “to speak” as “to utter words or articulate sounds with the ordinary voice.” Based on these definitions, the Court concluded that Orestoff does not meet the qualification of being able to “speak” because, as a deaf-mute, he cannot articulate or utter words to make himself understood.
The Court rejected the argument for a liberal interpretation that would equate writing with speaking. It reasoned that if the legislature intended the requirement to be satisfied by expressing thoughts through writing or other comprehensible signs, it would have been superfluous to separately require both speaking and writing. The Court emphasized that its duty is to apply the law as written, not to legislate. While the Solicitor General suggested that Orestoff’s ability to write English should suffice, the Court stated that any consideration of such policy arguments belongs to the Legislature, not the Judiciary.
Therefore, since Orestoff lacks the specific qualification of being able to “speak” as required by law, his petition for naturalization was properly denied. Costs were imposed on the appellant.