G.R. No. L-46650 February 27, 1978
JOSE L.C. DIZON, petitioner, vs. HON. MILAGROS A. GERMAN, and the Deputy Sheriff of Angeles City, HILARIO C. SALVADOR, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from an agrarian dispute where tenants sued petitioner Jose L.C. Dizon for re-liquidation of past harvests and reduction of leasehold rentals. Dizon counterclaimed for ejectment. The Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) initially dismissed both the complaint and counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the complaint, sustained the tenants’ right to reduced rentals, and remanded the case to the CAR for determination of the amount. After hearings, the CAR issued a supplemental decision on February 25, 1970, ordering Dizon to reimburse his five tenants a total of 660 cavans and 22 kilos of palay, representing excess rentals, or its cash equivalent computed at the prevailing market price at the time of payment, with 6% interest per annum. Dizon’s appeal from this supplemental decision was eventually dismissed, and the decision became final and executory.
Thereafter, multiple writs of execution were issued to enforce the judgment. Dizon repeatedly challenged these writs through various petitions, including to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, effectively delaying execution for years. The latest challenged order, dated June 28, 1977, granted the tenants’ motion for an alias writ of execution. The Deputy Sheriff levied on Dizon’s personal properties, appraising the palay debt at P55.00 per cavan, the current market price, which with interest totaled P51,582.00. Dizon contested this, proposing an appraisal at P8.90 per cavan and offering his landholdings for payment instead.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge and sheriff acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing and implementing the alias writ of execution.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The supplemental decision of February 25, 1970 had long become final and executory, rendering its terms conclusive between the parties. The order for Dizon to reimburse the palay “or its equivalent in cash computed at the prevailing market price in the locality at the time of payment” was clear and unambiguous. The sheriff’s act of using the current price of P55.00 per cavan was a faithful implementation of this directive, as “the time of payment” logically refers to the time when execution is finally enforced after the judgment’s finality. Dizon’s protracted use of dilatory legal maneuvers to forestall execution for approximately eight years could not alter this clear obligation. His alternative proposals for valuation and payment were impermissible attempts to vary the terms of a final judgment. The execution of a final judgment is a matter of right, and it is the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ upon application of the prevailing party. The respondents’ actions were a proper implementation of the law and the social justice provisions of the Constitution, not an abuse of authority.