G.R. No. 4640

CLARA MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EL CHINO VELASCO, defendant-appellee.
September 17, 1908

FACTS:
On November 21, 1906, Clara Marcelo was injured in El Chino Velasco’s store when pieces of tin fell on her, breaking both her legs. She was hospitalized until July 29, 1907. Marcelo filed a lawsuit seeking over P20,000 in damages. The trial court awarded her P2,268.24, which included P1,813 for doctor’s and hospital bills and P555.24 for lost profits (calculated at P70 per month for the period of her hospitalization). Marcelo appealed the judgment, contending that the awarded damages were insufficient. Specifically, she argued that: (1) her lost profits were higher (P300/month); (2) she should be compensated for lost profits beyond her hospital stay due to slight lameness; (3) damages should include the possibility of future medical complications; (4) she should be compensated for pain and suffering; and (5) the award for hospital bills should have been paid directly to her, not the hospital. The defendant did not appeal.

ISSUE:
Can damages for pain and suffering be recovered under Article 1902 of the Civil Code (or equivalent provisions for civil liability) in an action for quasi-delict?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable under the provisions of the Civil Code then in force.

The Court reasoned that Article 1902 (obligation to repair damage due to fault or negligence) and Article 1106 (indemnity for losses and damages includes loss suffered and profits failed to realize) of the Civil Code, as well as Articles 119 and 121 of the Penal Code (civil liability includes reparation for damage caused and indemnification for losses), were interpreted to cover only material or economic losses. The Court found no precedent in Spanish jurisprudence or commentaries that would permit recovery for “pain and suffering,” concluding that the phrase “to repair the damage caused” refers to quantifiable and reparable pecuniary harm.

Regarding the other points of appeal:
1. Lost Profits: The Court found no error in the trial court’s assessment of P70 per month for lost profits, as Marcelo failed to conclusively prove higher profits or that the business was solely hers.
2. Duration of Lost Profits: Damages for lost profits were correctly limited to the period of hospitalization, as Marcelo offered no evidence that her slight lameness after leaving the hospital interfered with her ability to conduct business or reduced her income.
3. Future Complications: Damages for the possibility of future bone necrosis were denied, as Marcelo did not present proof that such complications had, in fact, arisen.
4. Payment to Hospital: The Court upheld the order for direct payment of hospital bills to St. Paul’s Hospital. It was noted that neither Marcelo nor her husband had agreed to pay these bills, and the doctors and hospital did not expect payment unless made voluntarily, suggesting that Marcelo was not prejudiced by this arrangement. The defendant, the party who might have a grievance regarding this payment order, did not appeal.

Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in its entirety.