G.R. No. L-46329 April 10, 1979
JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ANTONIO SANTAMARIA, RAMON IGNACIO MORAN, EUGENIO LOPEZ III, and JAIME CLAPAROLS, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge presiding over the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Metro Manila, HON. EMMANUEL G. PEÑA, as Acting District State Prosecutor And the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

The petitioners were charged with multiple rape in two separate criminal cases before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig. After the prosecution rested its case, all petitioners filed demurrers to the evidence (motions to dismiss/acquit), arguing that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz denied these motions in an order dated February 7, 1977, and subsequently denied their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners then filed a motion for separate trials, contending that their individual defenses were distinct, particularly as the evidence did not show collective participation in all alleged acts. This motion was also denied by the respondent judge in an order dated June 10, 1977.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus, seeking to annul the orders denying their demurrers and motion for separate trial, and to compel their acquittal or, alternatively, the granting of separate trials. They also applied for a writ of habeas corpus and a temporary restraining order, which the Court granted, halting the proceedings in the lower court.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) Whether the Supreme Court can, via a special civil action, review the trial court’s interlocutory order denying a demurrer to the evidence and compel a judgment of acquittal; and (2) Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion for separate trials.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition insofar as it sought the annulment of the orders denying the demurrer to the evidence and a directive for acquittal. However, it granted the alternative prayer for separate trials.
On the first issue, the Court held that the denial of a demurrer to the evidence is an interlocutory order that generally cannot be reviewed by certiorari or prohibition. A demurrer questions the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. The established rule is that when such a demurrer is denied, the remedy for the accused is to proceed with the presentation of their defense, and if convicted, to appeal the judgment. The Supreme Court, in a special civil action, cannot preempt the trial court by reviewing the evidence and ordering an acquittal at an interlocutory stage. To do so would be a premature adjudication on the merits, infringing upon the trial court’s duty to evaluate all evidence from both sides before rendering a verdict. The petitioners’ proper course was to present their evidence and await the final judgment.
On the second issue, the Court found that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for separate trials. The charges involved multiple accused and distinct allegations concerning their individual participation at different times and locations. The petitioners correctly argued that their defenses were separate and individual. For instance, the evidence suggested some accused arrived after the alleged incidents began. A joint trial under these circumstances could prejudice individual accused by exposing them to evidence of acts committed by others before their arrival or in which they did not participate. The Rules of Court allow for separate trials to prevent such prejudice and ensure a fair determination of each accused’s individual criminal liability. The denial of this motion under the circumstances was a capricious