GR 45628; (December, 1937) (Digest)
G.R. No. 45628 , December 17, 1937
ANGLAO GUILAMBO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, BALTAZAR ALUNEN and EMMA ALUNEN, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Anglao Guilambo sought a review via certiorari of a Court of Appeals decision reversing the trial court and awarding possession of a land to respondents Baltazar Alunen and Emma Alunen. The Supreme Court initially denied the petition. Petitioner filed a second motion for reconsideration, raising procedural issues. The procedural timeline was: the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on February 24, 1937; petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 9; it was denied on March 30, with notice on March 31; the clerk entered final judgment on April 3 and remanded the records on April 5; petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence on April 9. The Court of Appeals treated this as an improper second motion for reconsideration (filed without prior leave) and denied it. Petitioner argued the clerk prematurely entered judgment and remanded records, prejudicing his right to file a second motion for reconsideration (with leave) or a first motion for new trial, and to appeal by certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly denied petitioner’s motion for new trial, considering the timing of the entry of final judgment and the remand of records.
RULING
Yes, the Court of Appeals correctly denied the motion. The Supreme Court held that under its rules (Rule 39), only one 15-day period is granted for filing a motion for reconsideration or new trial, counted from the promulgation of the decision. The period is interrupted while a motion is pending and resumes upon notice of its denial. Here, the decision was promulgated on February 24. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, filed on March 9, interrupted the period. Notice of its denial was received on March 31, and the period resumed. The clerk entered final judgment on April 3 (17 days from promulgation, excluding the interruption), which was proper as the 15-day period had effectively expired. The motion for new trial filed on April 9 was filed 23 days from promulgation and 8 days after the period expired, thus out of time. The Court distinguished the case from Cuyugan vs. Baron, where leave to file a second motion was sought with due diligence immediately after notice. Petitioner’s computation, suggesting multiple 15-day periods for successive motions, was erroneous. The entry of judgment and remand were not premature, and petitioner’s rights were not prejudiced.
AI Generated by Armztrong.