G.R. No. 45425 & 45965 March 27, 1992
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.

RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE GUINTO, respondents.

FACTS

Maria Lizares y Alunan died on January 28, 1968, leaving a will. Her niece, Eustaquia Lizares, filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate (Special Proceedings No. 8452). The will was probated, Eustaquia was appointed executrix, and her project of partition was granted by the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. The court adjudicated the properties to the heirs and ordered the closure of the proceedings. The proceedings were later reopened to adjudicate omitted properties to Eustaquia. On November 28, 1972, the heirs, including Eustaquia, executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, terminating their co-ownership over certain lots. Eustaquia Lizares died single and without descendants on November 23, 1973. Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of her intestate estate.
Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (petitioners in G.R. No. 45425), citing paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares’s will which they claimed contained a simple substitution, filed a motion to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed to be declared heirs to specific properties (1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang) since Eustaquia died single and without descendants. The motion was denied by the probate court on April 6, 1974, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1974. The court held the judgment was binding and the movants’ remedies had lapsed.
Subsequently, on October 14, 1974, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joint administrators of Eustaquia’s estate (Civil Case No. 11639) and filed a notice of lis pendens. The joint administrators filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. On September 20, 1976, respondent Judge Ernesto Tengco issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration was denied on January 7, 1977. On January 31, 1977, the court issued another order setting for hearing the joint administrators’ motion to dismiss. These orders are the subject of the consolidated petitions for annulment.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders dated September 20, 1976 (cancelling the notice of lis pendens), January 7, 1977 (denying reconsideration), and January 31, 1977 (setting for hearing the motion to dismiss).

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition in G.R. No. 45425 and granted the petition in G.R. No. 45965. The Court made the temporary restraining order in L-45965 permanent.
The Court ruled that the probate court’s order of January 8, 1971, approving the project of partition and closing the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares, was a final order that had long become final and executory. The petitioners’ motion to reopen the estate proceedings, filed years later, was correctly denied as the court had lost jurisdiction over the estate. The settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, and the judgment is binding against the whole world. The petitioners, who were heirs and knew of the proceedings, did not participate or appeal, and their remedies under the Rules had lapsed.
Regarding the notice of lis pendens, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in its cancellation. The properties in question, being part of an estate under administration (the estate of Eustaquia Lizares), were in custodia legis. As such, they could not be alienated without court approval, making the notice of lis pendens unnecessary to protect any alleged interest. Furthermore, the annotation was prejudicial as it hindered the estate’s ability to secure crop loans necessary for sugar production.
The Court also addressed the nature of the testamentary provisions. It held that the provisions in paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares’s will were not a simple substitution but a fideicommissary substitution. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir (Eustaquia) is instituted with the obligation to preserve and transmit the property to a second heir upon the occurrence of a condition (Eustaquia dying single or without descendants). The Court found that the condition did not occur as stipulated because Eustaquia was instituted as a universal heir to the remainder of the estate, not solely to the specific properties mentioned in the contested clauses. The condition attached only to the specific properties (1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang), not to the entire inheritance. Since Eustaquia died after the estate had been settled and partitioned, and the specific properties had been validly adjudicated to her and subsequently included in the agreement of partition and subdivision with the other heirs, the condition could no longer be enforced. The properties had ceased to be the same ones referred to in the will, having been converted into individual titles through the partition. Therefore, the petitioners’ claim to these properties was without legal basis.
The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens and in proceeding to hear the motion to dismiss, as the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 appeared to be without merit.