G.R. No. L-45155 August 26, 1977
PRUDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MABUHAY INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The private respondent, Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty Co., Inc., as the appellant, was granted extensions to file its brief. Initially, it received a 90-day extension with a warning against further extensions. Despite this warning, the appellate court granted an additional 15-day extension. The appellant’s brief was ultimately filed on September 4, 1976. Subsequently, on September 30, 1976, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution stating that since no appellee’s brief had been filed within the reglementary period, the case was submitted for decision without it. The petitioner, Prudential Construction, Inc., as the appellee, received this resolution on October 7, 1976. It then filed a motion for reconsideration on October 25, 1976, specifying that it had not received a copy of the appellant’s brief as of that date and that its period to file the appellee’s brief had not yet lapsed. The Court of Appeals denied this motion on November 5, 1976.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing its September 30, 1976 resolution submitting the case for decision without the appellee’s brief and in denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion. The legal logic is anchored on the proper computation of reglementary periods and the fundamental requirement of due process. Under the applicable Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, the appellant had an initial 45-day period to file its brief. The extensions granted totaled 150 days. The appellee’s period to file its brief begins only from its receipt of the appellant’s brief. The record showed the petitioner-appellee had not received a copy of the appellant’s brief. Therefore, its period to file had not even commenced, let alone expired, when the appellate court issued its resolution deeming the case submitted. The Court found the respondent court’s act of resolving to decide the case without the appellee’s brief, based on the erroneous presumption that the period had lapsed, to be a precipitate haste that inflicted patent grave injustice upon the petitioner. This denial of the opportunity to be heard violated procedural due process. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the challenged resolutions and directed the Court of Appeals to grant the petitioner the full period allowed by the rules to file its appellee’s brief.