GR 44980; (February, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. 44980 February 6, 1990
VIRGINIA MARAHAY, petitioner, vs. HON. MENELEO C. MELICOR, as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch VI, Carigara, Leyte; ALIWANAG B. VALLERAMOS, LIGAYA BRAZIL y PEREZ, FRUTO BRAZIL, MATIBAY BRAZIL Y PALADIN and DALISAY BRAZIL Y AYASO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Virginia Marahay filed an action for recovery of real property. After issues were joined, trial commenced, and she took the witness stand. The continuation of her cross-examination was set for February 18, 1976. Her counsel, Atty. Dominador Monjardin, had earlier filed a motion for postponement due to a scheduled examination, and the court reset the hearing to the said date. On February 18, 1976, Marahay, who was an invalid moving around in a wheelchair, appeared in court, but her counsel did not. Private respondents orally moved to dismiss the case for alleged failure to prosecute. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Marahay filed two motions for reconsideration, both denied, prompting this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint due to the absence of petitioner’s counsel during a scheduled hearing, despite petitioner’s personal appearance.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court found grave abuse of discretion. The Court first addressed procedural propriety, noting that while an order of dismissal is ordinarily appealable, certiorari was allowed in this case due to the broader interests of justice, the showing of a good cause of action, and the trial court’s own suggestion of the remedy. On the substantive issue, the Court emphasized that Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes dismissal for the plaintiff’s failure to appear or to prosecute. Here, the plaintiff herself was present; only her counsel was absent. There was no showing of a pattern of delay or unwillingness to proceed on Marahay’s part. The Court ruled that the absence of counsel, unaccompanied by the plaintiff’s own absence or deliberate delay, does not warrant dismissal for failure to prosecute. The trial court should have afforded the petitioner, considering her physical handicap and lack of legal training, a reasonable opportunity to secure new counsel. Dismissals on technicalities are frowned upon, and rules should be liberally construed to ensure just determinations. The orders of dismissal were annulled, and the case was reinstated for trial on the merits.