G.R. No. L-44657, January 22, 1980
JOSE ONCHENGCO, petitioner, vs. CITY COURT OF ZAMBOANGA, GERARDO ERREA and JOSE ERREA, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Jose Onchengco filed an unlawful detainer complaint in the City Court of Zamboanga against respondents Gerardo and Jose Errea, who were occupying his two lots under an implied month-to-month lease at a token monthly rental of P5.00 each. The complaint alleged that since 1967, petitioner had repeatedly requested respondents to vacate due to his urgent need to sell the properties to raise funds for his medical treatment and livelihood, as he was aging and jobless. Formal written demands to vacate were sent in February and March 1973. Respondents admitted occupancy since 1946 and rental payments up to April 1973 but denied receiving demands to vacate. After petitioner presented his evidence, respondents filed a motion to dismiss over two years later, invoking Presidential Decree No. 20.
The respondent city court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the action sought to increase the monthly rental from P5.00 to P10.00, which contravened PD 20’s prohibition on rental increases for units renting for P300.00 or less. It also found no sufficient proof of petitioner’s urgent necessity for the property. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, arguing that the primary prayer was for ejectment due to his need to sell, was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court erred in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer based on PD 20, thereby depriving the lessor of his right to recover possession under the special circumstances of the case.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal orders and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordering respondents to vacate the premises. The legal logic is clear: while PD 20 suspended the provisions of Article 1673 of the Civil Code on judicial ejectment and prohibited rental increases for low-cost dwellings, it did not absolutely deprive lessors of all remedies for recovery of possession. The decree’s intent was to protect lessees from arbitrary ejectment and rent hikes, but it did not sanction the deprivation of a lessor’s right to terminate a lease under justifiable circumstances.
Here, the petitioner’s need to sell the property due to urgent personal necessity—his illness and lack of livelihood—constituted a valid ground for ejectment that was not precluded by PD 20. The respondent court fixated on the incidental prayer for a rental increase, misconstruing the main relief sought, which was recovery of possession. Moreover, respondents’ non-payment of rentals since May 1973 per se warranted ejectment. The Court also noted that respondents, in their comment, did not object to vacating if so ordered and had lost their right to present evidence after securing a dismissal via demurrer to evidence, which was now reversed. Consequently, equity and the specific facts demanded that petitioner’s right to possess his property be upheld.