GR 44205; (February, 1993) (Digest)
G.R. No. 44205 . February 16, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Branch XXI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and CONSOLACION NAVAL, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Consolacion Naval was separately accused of estafa (Criminal Case No. 15795) and falsification of a public document (Criminal Case No. 15796) before different branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The charges stemmed from the same transaction involving a parcel of land. The information for estafa alleged that on or about March 23, 1973, Naval, conspiring with another, defrauded Edilberto V. Ilano by selling him a parcel of land on August 12, 1969, receiving a partial payment, and later, without informing Ilano, executing an Application for Registration over the same land, obtaining title, and subsequently selling portions of the land to other persons. The information for falsification alleged that on or about August 17, 1971, Naval falsified a public document by executing an Application for Registration stating she was the exclusive owner and that the land was unencumbered, despite having already sold and encumbered it to Ilano in 1969. Naval moved to quash the falsification information, fearing conviction for the same offense. The trial court initially denied the motion but later reconsidered and quashed the information, believing the alleged falsification was a necessary means to commit estafa. The People, through the Solicitor General, filed this special civil action for certiorari to challenge the quashal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court correctly quashed the information for falsification on the ground that it constituted a complex crime with estafa, thereby barring separate prosecution.
RULING
No. The trial court erred in quashing the information for falsification.
First, the ground that falsification was a necessary means to commit estafa, constituting a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, was not specifically raised in Naval’s original motion to quash but only in a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a motion to quash shall specify the grounds relied upon, and the court shall hear no objection other than those stated. The trial court therefore should not have entertained this belated ground.
Second, even assuming the theory could be considered, it is untenable on the merits. The crimes were not committed as part of a single criminal impulse. The falsification was allegedly committed in 1971, while the estafa was consummated in 1973. The temporal gap and the discrepancy in the nature and elements of the offenses indicate they are distinct and independent crimes. Falsification through the execution of a public document containing untruthful statements is a crime complete upon its execution, independent of any subsequent estafa. Therefore, Naval can be prosecuted separately for falsification and estafa. The petition was granted, and the order quashing the information for falsification was set aside.
