G.R. No. L-43851. July 30, 1976.
LUZON SAFETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. CORETTE S. MAGBANUA and DANIEL Z. ROMUALDEZ, defendants, ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Luzon Surety Company filed a complaint in the City Court of Manila against Corette S. Magbanua, Daniel Z. Romualdez, and Antonio V. Raquiza to enforce an indemnity agreement related to a bail bond. Only defendant Romualdez filed an answer, specifically denying the execution of the agreement and alleging forgery. Defendants Magbanua and Raquiza failed to file their answers and were declared in default. The City Court, applying Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, proceeded to try the case based on the answer filed by Romualdez and the evidence presented, rendering judgment against the defaulting defendants, Magbanua and Raquiza. Raquiza’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was granted, allowing him to file an answer, but he again failed to do so and was declared in default a second time, leading to a reaffirmed judgment against him.
Raquiza appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), where he finally filed an answer. The CFI, however, disallowed this answer and affirmed the City Court’s decision. Raquiza moved for reconsideration, arguing that his appeal vacated the inferior court’s judgment, necessitating a trial de novo, and that the answer filed by his co-defendant Romualdez should be treated as his own answer. The CFI denied his motion.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance erred in: (1) disallowing Raquiza’s answer and not conducting a trial de novo upon appeal; and (2) not treating the answer filed by co-defendant Romualdez as the answer of Raquiza.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. On the first issue, the Court held that while a perfected appeal from a municipal court to the CFI generally vacates the judgment and requires a trial de novo, this rule presupposes that the appellant had participated in the inferior court by filing an answer. Raquiza was declared in default for his failure to file any answer in the City Court. A defendant in default loses his standing in court and forfeits his right to present evidence, to be heard, or to appeal from the judgment, except against its validity. His appeal to the CFI did not automatically restore his right to file an answer; the CFI correctly disallowed his belated answer.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that Raquiza could not benefit from the answer filed by his co-defendant Romualdez. Under Section 4, Rule 18, the City Court properly tried the case against all defendants upon the answer filed by Romualdez, but this procedural mechanism for trial does not mean that the defenses in one answer are imputed to a defaulting co-defendant. Defenses are personal. Romualdez’s specific defense of forgery pertained solely to his own signature and could not be adopted by Raquiza, who had never asserted such a defense for himself. Furthermore, Romualdez had died, and the case against him was dismissed; thus, there was no viable answer from him to be reproduced in the CFI for Raquiza’s use. Consequently, the CFI committed no error in its rulings.