G.R. No. L-43813 and L-43952, May 24, 1977
FRANCISCO C. HERNANDEZ, etc., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents. / CELESTINO C. HERNANDEZ, et al., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents.

FACTS

These consolidated petitions sought a review of the Court of Appeals’ decision dismissing a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The underlying dispute originated from Special Proceeding No. 5309 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, involving the estate of the late Maximo C. Hernandez Sr. The petitioners, heirs of the decedent, challenged two specific orders of the probate court: the April 24, 1967 order admitting the last will and testament to probate, and the August 10, 1968 order directing the estate to pay Atty. Rosendo J. Tansinsin the sum of P250,000 as attorney’s fees. During the pendency of these Supreme Court petitions, Francisco C. Hernandez, the petitioner in L-43813 and the judicial administrator, passed away, leading to substitutions by his heirs and later by a new estate administrator.
Subsequently, a significant development occurred. All parties with an interest in the estate, including the petitioners in both cases, the new administrator Ernesto O. Rodas, and all other heirs, jointly filed a Motion to Dismiss dated March 7, 1977. They grounded this motion on having amicably settled their differences and agreeing upon a “Partial Project of Partition and Settlement of Claims,” which had been approved by the probate court on March 3, 1977. Only Atty. Manuel T. De Guia, former counsel for the deceased administrator, filed a comment, which lamented a lack of notice but raised no substantive objection to the dismissal itself.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should grant the Joint Motion to Dismiss the petitions in light of the supervening amicable settlement among all interested parties.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court granted the Motion to Dismiss. The legal logic is anchored on the judicial policy of encouraging compromise settlements to expedite the resolution of disputes, particularly in estate proceedings which are inherently protracted. When all real parties in interest voluntarily agree to settle their claims and partition the estate, and that settlement has received the approval of the probate court vested with primary jurisdiction over the estate, the very subject matter of the appeal is extinguished. The Court recognized that the approval of the Partial Project of Partition rendered the pending petitions moot and academic. There was no longer any actual, live controversy for the Court to adjudicate, as the relief originally sought by the petitioners—challenging the probate and fee orders—was overtaken by the comprehensive settlement agreed upon by the entire estate. The Court also noted that the comment filed by the former counsel did not constitute a valid opposition to the dismissal, as it raised no legal impediment but only a professional grievance, which it reserved for his separate action in the lower court. Consequently, dismissal was the proper course to avoid rendering a decision on a moot case.