GR 43652; (March, 1977) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-43652 March 24, 1977
SPOUSES MARIA and FERNANDO SAMBAJON, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE EDUARDO TUTAAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, Quezon City, and MERRYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS
The spouses Sambajon owned a lot and apartment mortgaged to GSIS. To pay arrears, they executed a deed of sale with assumption of mortgage in favor of Merryland Development Corporation for P65,000. The Sambajons later sued for reformation of this document, claiming it was a mortgage, not a sale. GSIS foreclosed the property. Merryland redeemed it from GSIS and, after a court process, obtained a writ of possession upheld by the Court of Appeals. Within the one-year redemption period, the Sambajons themselves redeemed the property from the sheriff. Merryland then filed a new case to annul this redemption and a subsequent mortgage by the Sambajons. The Sambajons moved to consolidate this new case with their two earlier pending cases before another branch. Judge Tutaan denied consolidation. Meanwhile, the Sambajons obtained a separate writ of possession from the judge in the earlier case, regaining physical possession of the property.
ISSUE
The core issues are: (1) Which party is entitled to possession of the property pending litigation of the multiple related cases? (2) Should the three interrelated cases be consolidated and transferred for joint trial?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that Merryland is entitled to possession pending litigation and ordered the consolidation of the three cases. The legal logic is grounded in procedural order and the substantive effects of prior judicial affirmations. First, regarding possession, the Court found the Sambajons’ claim to possessory rights pendente lite to have “no leg to stand on.” This is because the Court of Appeals had previously nullified the very order from Judge Valencia upon which the Sambajons’ recent repossession was based. In contrast, Merryland’s possession, derived from its redemption and a writ of possession subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals, had superior legal footing at that juncture. To preserve the status quo and prevent further disorder, the Court ordered the property restored to Merryland, subject to the deposit of collected rentals in court.
Second, on the issue of consolidation, the Court set aside Judge Tutaan’s denial. It held that “common sense and convenience dictate that the three related cases should be tried jointly by one Judge.” The cases involved the same property and stemmed from the same series of transactions—the original mortgage, the disputed deed with Merryland, and the successive redemptions. Trying them separately before different judges risked conflicting rulings and wasted judicial resources. Therefore, the Executive Judge was directed to raffle all three cases to a single branch, excluding the two already involved, to ensure expeditious and unified adjudication. The resolution balanced possessory rights based on established legal procedures with the overarching need for efficient and orderly administration of justice.