GR 43342; (October, 1978) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-43342. October 30, 1978.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED and NORTH BRITISH & MERCANTILE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, petitioners, vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company received a copy of the trial court’s order dismissing its complaint on June 7, 1974. On June 28, 1974, within the reglementary period, it filed a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and an ex parte motion for a 30-day extension to file its record on appeal. The trial court granted the extension on July 3, 1974. The petitioners, Commercial Union and North British, opposed the motion and later moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the ex parte motion for extension was a “mere scrap of paper” for failure to comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as it lacked notice of hearing addressed to the adverse parties. The trial court denied the opposition and approved the appeal. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-39194), which was dismissed on November 2, 1974. The case proceeded to the Court of Appeals, which initially dismissed Lepanto’s appeal but later, upon reconsideration, reinstated it. The petitioners then filed the instant petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in granting Lepanto’s ex parte motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal and in subsequently approving the appeal, despite alleged procedural defects in the motion.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the validity of the appeal. The Court explained that while the ex parte motion for extension did not strictly comply with the notice requirements of Rule 15, the prevailing judicial policy is one of liberality in the interpretation of procedural rules to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases. The motion was filed within the original reglementary period and was grounded on a reasonable cause—the demands on counsel’s professional time. The Court emphasized that the motion was non-litigious and not intended to delay the proceedings, and it did not affect the substantive rights of the adverse party. Under Section 6, Rule 15, a court may act on a motion without proof of service if satisfied that the adverse party’s rights are not affected. The trial court was thus within its authority to grant the extension. The subsequent filing of the record on appeal within the extended period was therefore timely, conferring jurisdiction upon the appellate court. The Supreme Court’s prior dismissal of the petitioners’ earlier certiorari petition (G.R. No. L-39194) against the same orders was a definitive adjudication on the merits, barring relitigation of the issue under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court affirmed the appellate court’s resolution reinstating the appeal.
