GR 42391; (October, 1934) (Digest)
G.R. No. 42391 ; October 10, 1934
ORIENTAL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. QUIRICO ABETO and ALEJO MABANAG, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. filed a collection case against Gregorio Bugayong, Vicente Rosario, and respondent Alejo Mabanag. The trial court held only Bugayong liable. On appeal, the Supreme Court modified the judgment, ordering “all the defendants and appellees” to pay the sum of P5,742.73 with interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. This judgment became final. Petitioner obtained a writ of execution. Respondent Mabanag moved to enjoin the execution sale of his properties, arguing he was only a joint obligor and, as a surety, execution should first proceed against the principal debtor Bugayong. The trial court granted the motion, ordering that no execution issue against Mabanag until after Bugayong’s property was exhausted. Petitioner filed this certiorari petition to annul that order.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court, in issuing the order requiring exhaustion of the principal debtor’s property before executing against Mabanag, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or abused its discretion.
RULING
Yes, the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s final judgment, which superseded the original action, imposed a joint (mancomunada) obligation, not a joint and several (solidary) one, as it did not expressly state the defendants were liable “jointly and severally.” Under Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code and established doctrine, when a judgment does not specify joint and several liability, the obligation is presumed joint. Consequently, Mabanag could not be compelled to pay the judgment in full. However, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by granting Mabanag the benefit of exhaustion (excussion). The final judgment did not characterize any defendant as a surety or grant such a benefit; it merely established a joint obligation. Therefore, while execution against Mabanag could not be for the full unpaid balance (as his liability was only for his proportionate share), the condition requiring prior exhaustion of the principal debtor’s property was improper. The petition was denied, but the Supreme Court clarified that Mabanag was not entitled to the benefit of exhaustion.
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