G.R. No. 42037. March 21, 1990.
DOMINGO V. LUGTU, DEMETRIO SANCHEZ, as Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSA L. CANCIO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Domingo V. Lugtu, together with private respondent Rosa L. Cancio and Clodualdo F. Vitug, were charged with estafa before the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The information alleged that Cancio and Vitug induced Lugtu to open a checking account, sign blank checks, and deliver them to Vitug, who, as a PNB teller, filled them out and encashed them despite insufficient funds, causing damage to PNB. All accused pleaded not guilty. After presenting three witnesses, the Provincial Fiscal moved to discharge Lugtu as a state witness. The trial court, initially denying the motion, later granted it in an Order dated June 19, 1974, finding full compliance with Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
Accused Cancio moved for reconsideration, presenting an earlier sworn statement (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 10, 1973, executed by Lugtu before the PC of Bataan, wherein he admitted responsibility. The trial court denied her motion and a subsequent one. Cancio then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the trial court’s orders and reinstated Lugtu to the information. The appellate court held that the conditions for discharge under Section 9, Rule 119 were not met, citing Lugtu’s earlier confession and the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses as direct evidence, making Lugtu’s testimony not absolutely necessary.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the conditions for discharging an accused as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court were not present.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s orders. The legal logic centers on the proper application of the conditions for discharge and the standard of review. Section 9, Rule 119 requires that: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony; (b) there is no other direct evidence available; (c) the testimony can be substantially corroborated; (d) the defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) the defendant has no prior conviction involving moral turpitude.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. The determination of whether these conditions exist is primarily within the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best position to evaluate the evidence. The appellate court erred in relying on Lugtu’s earlier sworn statement of March 10, 1973, as it was inadmissible for being executed without the assistance of counsel, violating constitutional rights. Furthermore, the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses only established the modus operandi but did not provide direct evidence of the conspiracy and the specific roles of each accused, particularly Cancio’s alleged inducement. Lugtu’s detailed affidavit of February 8, 1974, was necessary to establish these crucial elements.
Regarding the condition that the discharged accused must not appear to be the “most guilty,” the Court clarified that an admission of participation does not automatically disqualify him. The rule only requires that he does not appear to be the most guilty. The trial court’s finding that Lugtu, having been induced by his co-accused, was not the most guilty, was not shown to be a grave abuse of discretion. The discharge of an accused as a state witness is a procedural tool to secure the conviction of the more guilty