G.R. No. 42037 March 21, 1990
DOMINGO V. LUGTU, DEMETRIO SANCHEZ, as Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSA L. CANCIO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Domingo V. Lugtu, together with private respondent Rosa L. Cancio and Clodualdo F. Vitug, were charged with estafa before the Court of First Instance of Bataan. The information alleged that Cancio and Vitug induced Lugtu to open a checking account, sign blank checks, and deliver them to Vitug, who, as a PNB teller, filled them out and fraudulently encashed them despite insufficient funds, causing damage to the bank. All accused pleaded not guilty. After presenting three witnesses, the Provincial Fiscal moved to discharge Lugtu from the information to utilize him as a state witness against his co-accused. The trial court initially denied the motion but, upon reconsideration and after finding compliance with Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, issued orders authorizing Lugtu’s discharge.
Accused Cancio opposed the discharge, citing an earlier sworn statement (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 10, 1973, executed by Lugtu before the PC of Bataan, wherein he admitted responsibility. Her motions for reconsideration were denied. Cancio then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the trial judge. The appellate court granted the petition, set aside the trial court’s orders, and ordered Lugtu’s reinstatement to the information, ruling that the conditions for discharge under the Rules were not met.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in discharging accused Domingo V. Lugtu to be a state witness.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s orders. The legal logic centers on the proper application of Section 9, Rule 119, which governs the discharge of an accused to become a state witness. The provision requires the trial court’s judgment that: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony; (b) there is no other direct evidence available; (c) the testimony can be substantially corroborated; (d) the defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) the defendant has no prior conviction involving moral turpitude.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the evidence’s necessity. The appellate court incorrectly concluded that the first two conditions were absent simply because three witnesses had testified on the modus operandi and because of Lugtu’s earlier sworn statement. The Court emphasized that the earlier statement was inadmissible as it was not shown to have been executed with the assistance of counsel, in violation of constitutional rights. Furthermore, the details in Lugtu’s subsequent affidavit were more comprehensive, and his candid admission of participation could guarantee truthful testimony.
Regarding the condition that the discharged accused must not appear to be the “most guilty,” the Court clarified that the rule does not disqualify an accused merely for having committed the crime or a falsification. The requirement is comparative guilt among the accused. The trial court’s finding that Lugtu was not the most guilty, based on its evaluation of the evidence, deserved respect. The discharge of an accused is a matter soundly entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, and absent a clear abuse, its determination should prevail. The trial court had meticulously found compliance with all statutory conditions, and thus, no grave abuse of discretion attended its orders.