GR 41672; (March, 1977) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41672. March 30, 1977.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SEGUNDO M. ZOSA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, JUSTINA SALAZAR LAPIDARIO, TOMAS MACASIL, SR., and SANTOS MACASIL, SR., respondents.
FACTS
Private respondents were convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar. They appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Samar. Respondent Judge Zosa, finding that the municipal court proceedings were not duly recorded, ordered a trial de novo. The prosecution presented its evidence without objecting to this procedure. After the prosecution rested, the defense moved to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence. The CFI granted the motion and dismissed the case.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the appeal. It contended that appeals in grave coercion cases, falling under the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts and CFIs, should go directly to the Court of Appeals. It also asserted that the municipal court proceedings were in fact recorded. The CFI denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance of Samar had appellate jurisdiction over the appealed grave coercion case from the Municipal Court of Daram.
RULING
Yes, the CFI validly exercised appellate jurisdiction. The core legal issue involves the interpretation of appellate jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act, as amended. The crime of grave coercion, punishable by arresto mayor or a fine, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of municipal courts and Courts of First Instance. Under Section 45 of the Judiciary Act (Republic Act No. 296), as it stood at the time, the CFI generally had appellate jurisdiction over “all cases arising in municipal and city courts.” Republic Act No. 6031 created an exception, providing that in cases under concurrent jurisdiction, “the appeal shall be made directly to the Court of Appeals.” However, this provision refers to the appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance, not from the municipal court. The direct appeal to the Court of Appeals contemplated is from the CFI’s decision, not a bypass of the CFI. The first instance appeal from the municipal court’s decision in a concurrent jurisdiction case like this one properly lay with the CFI, as expressly stated in Section 45.
Furthermore, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the CFI’s jurisdiction or its finding on the lack of a proper record. The prosecution actively participated in the trial de novo without prior objection, thereby acquiescing to the CFI’s authority and its factual determination. A party cannot assume a position, benefit from it, and later repudiate it to the prejudice of the adverse party. The petition for certiorari was therefore denied.