GR 41667; (April, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-41667. April 30, 1976.
DELTA MOTOR SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO MANGOSING, Branch XXIV, Court of First Instance of Manila, THE CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, and JOSE LUIS PAMINTUAN, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Jose Luis Pamintuan sued petitioner Delta Motor Sales Corporation for damages and attorney’s fees, alleging breach of warranty over a defective Toyota car. The summons was served on April 19, 1975, upon an employee, Dionisia G. Miranda, who signed the receipt. Delta Motor failed to file an answer. Consequently, the trial court declared it in default and rendered a judgment by default, ordering it to pay damages. Delta Motor moved to set aside the order and judgment, arguing improper service of summons. It contended Miranda was merely a secretary in the personnel department, not an officer or agent authorized under the Rules to receive summons. The trial court denied the motion, ruling Miranda was a person of suitable age and discretion under the rules. It subsequently denied Delta Motor’s motion for reconsideration and granted Pamintuan’s motion for execution, refusing to give due course to Delta Motor’s appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Delta Motor through the service of summons upon its employee, Dionisia G. Miranda.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court annulled the orders and judgment by default. The Court held that service of summons upon a private domestic corporation is strictly governed by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Service must be made personally on the corporation’s president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. Substituted service under Section 8 may be availed of only if service cannot be made personally upon any of these designated officers. In such a case, substituted service may be effected by leaving copies with a competent person in charge of the officer’s office. The record showed Dionisia G. Miranda was not an officer listed in Section 13. Furthermore, there was no showing that she was the competent person in charge of the office of any such officer. Therefore, the service of summons upon her was invalid. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Delta Motor, rendering all subsequent proceedings, including the order of default and the judgment by default, null and void. The Court set aside the challenged orders and directed the trial court to admit Delta Motor’s answer. It also noted the pendency of a related replevin case filed by Delta Motor in Pasig and suggested its consolidation with the Manila case for a joint trial.