G.R. No. L-41251. March 31, 1976.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MANUEL GEROMO, petitioners, vs. HON. GREGORIO CONSULTA and LEA B. OLAGUER, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Manuel Geromo filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Guinobatan, Albay, charging private respondent Lea B. Olaguer with violation of the Usury Law. The complaint alleged that in November 1972, Olaguer lent him money and goods totaling P560.00 and, after a partial payment, charged a usurious interest rate of .03% per month. Upon arraignment, Olaguer pleaded not guilty and moved to quash the complaint on the ground that it charged no offense. The municipal court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Geromo’s motion for reconsideration and to accept an amended complaint was denied. He then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay, which was dismissed, though the court indicated a new complaint could be filed under Rule 117, Section 3.
Geromo subsequently filed a new complaint for the same offense with the CFI. However, the respondent judge, upon Olaguer’s motion, dismissed this second complaint on the ground that it would place her in double jeopardy. Geromo’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the instant petition, where the People of the Philippines was impleaded as a principal party petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether the dismissal of the first complaint and the subsequent filing of a second complaint for the same offense placed the private respondent in double jeopardy.

RULING

No, double jeopardy did not attach. The protection against double jeopardy requires the presence of four requisites in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. Here, the first complaint was dismissed upon the accused’s motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense—a ground under Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. Section 8 of the same Rule explicitly states that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, unless the motion was based on the grounds that the criminal action has been extinguished or that the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy. The dismissal in the first case was not based on these excepted grounds.
Crucially, the first complaint was substantively defective. It alleged an interest rate of .03% per month, which is not usurious under the law. A complaint that fails to allege facts constituting an offense is invalid. Since there was no valid complaint to begin with, the court never acquired jurisdiction to place the accused in jeopardy. The dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits but a termination due to a defective pleading. Consequently, the principle of res judicata does not apply, and the filing of a second, properly amended complaint is permissible. The respondent court therefore erred in dismissing the second complaint on grounds of double jeopardy. The order of dismissal is reversed, and the respondent court is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 4738.