G.R. No. L-41063, January 20, 1976
FRANK RAYMOND KRUEGER, assisted by his guardian ad litem, FRANCIS AUSTRIA KRUEGER, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BERNARDO O. VALDEZ and LUCINA SIAPNO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Frank Raymond Krueger, assisted by his guardian ad litem, appealed to the Court of Appeals after the Court of First Instance dismissed his complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages concerning a mining claim. Private respondents Bernardo O. Valdez and Lucina Siapno moved to dismiss the appeal, alleging Krueger’s Record on Appeal failed to comply with Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Specifically, they argued it did not state the date of receipt of the appealed decision in the Notice of Appeal and failed to show the kind of appeal bond posted and its court approval.
Krueger opposed the motion, directing the appellate court’s attention to page 46 of his Record on Appeal, which chronologically listed the dates of receipt of the decision and the order denying reconsideration, the filing of the Notice of Appeal and a motion to appeal as a pauper (erroneously designated as an appeal bond), and the grant of an extension to file the Record on Appeal. He explained that his counsel received the decision on April 8, 1974, filed a motion for reconsideration, and upon denial, filed the Notice of Appeal and a motion to appeal as a pauper on June 13, 1974, which was the next working day after the last day to appeal fell on a holiday.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal for alleged non-compliance with the “material data rule” under Section 6, Rule 41.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order, reinstating the appeal. The Court applied the liberalized interpretation of the “material data rule” established in Berkenkotter v. Court of Appeals. The rigid doctrine previously required all necessary data proving the timeliness of the appeal to appear on the face of the Record on Appeal itself. However, Berkenkotter held that if the trial court’s order approving the Record on Appeal finds it was filed on time, this finding is sufficient for the appellate court to determine jurisdiction, and the Record on Appeal need not reproduce such data independently.
Here, the trial court’s Order of August 7, 1974, explicitly approved Krueger’s Record on Appeal and noted the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period. This approval, rendered after Berkenkotter, was binding. The listed chronology on page 46 of the Record on Appeal, when read together with the trial court’s approval order, substantially complied with the rule. Regarding the appeal bond, the argument was unmeritorious as the trial court had approved Krueger’s motion to appeal as a pauper, exempting him from filing any appeal bond under Section 22, Rule 3. The mention of an “appeal bond” was a mere inadvertence referring to the pauper motion. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal constituted a grave abuse of discretion for not applying the prevailing liberal doctrine.