GR 40889; (December, 1933) (Digest)
G.R. No. 40889, December 22, 1933
ISIDRO YBOLEON, petitioner, vs. PEDRO MA. SISON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, GRACIANA ACUÑA DE YBOLEON and TAISHO MARINE & FIRE INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS
Graciana Acuña de Yboleon filed a complaint against her husband Isidro Yboleon and Taisho Marine & Fire Insurance Co., Inc., claiming ownership over the proceeds of a fire insurance policy covering a house destroyed by fire. After amendments to the pleadings, the spouses, assisted by counsel, entered into a compromise agreement. They stipulated that the house and the land it stood on were conjugal partnership property, the insurance proceeds should be divided equally, the land title should be reissued in the name of the conjugal partnership, and Graciana would withdraw a separate support case and provide a letter from their children retracting slanderous charges. The trial court approved the compromise and rendered a judgment in accordance with it. Two days later, Graciana filed an ex parte motion asking the court to modify the judgment to order the physical division of the land and issuance of separate titles. The trial judge, without hearing the other party or receiving evidence, issued an order setting aside the portion of the judgment relating to the land. Isidro Yboleon filed this petition for certiorari, arguing the trial judge acted in excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether the trial judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in setting aside a judgment based on a compromise agreement, without the consent of both parties and without a prior hearing to determine the existence of grounds for annulment under the law.
RULING
Yes. The petition for certiorari is granted. The trial judge’s order setting aside the judgment is declared null and void. A judgment based on a compromise has the force of res judicata and is immediately executory. Such a judgment cannot be amended or set aside without the consent of all parties, or without a prior hearing and a judicial declaration that the compromise itself is vitiated by any of the grounds for nullity specified in Article 1817 of the Civil Code (such as error, deceit, violence, or forgery). The motion for annulment was based on the alleged failure to understand the term “conjugal partnership property,” which is not a legal ground for annulment. The court acted in excess of its jurisdiction by reopening the judgment based on a mere motion without the required consent or evidentiary hearing. The petition is dismissed as to the insurance company respondent.
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