G.R. No. L-40837. April 29, 1977.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONSTANTE L. DE PERALTA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II, CFI, Surigao del Norte and ISABEL LAURON, respondents.

FACTS

An information for grave oral defamation was filed against Isabel Lauron on January 24, 1974, concerning an alleged offense committed on December 15, 1973. The respondent judge dismissed this initial case (Criminal Case No. 351) on March 14, 1974, upon Lauron’s motion. The dismissal was grounded on the alleged nullity of the information, as the preliminary investigation was claimed not to have complied with the mandatory oath requirements before the investigating fiscal under Presidential Decree No. 77. The dismissal order was explicitly “without prejudice” to the filing of a new information after a proper preliminary investigation.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration of this dismissal on March 18, 1974. While this motion was pending, a new preliminary investigation was conducted. A second information for the same offense was subsequently filed on December 16, 1974, docketed as Criminal Case No. 426. The respondent judge, however, dismissed this second case on April 30, 1975, on the ground of prescription. He ruled that the two-year prescriptive period for the crime commenced on December 15, 1973, and was not interrupted by the filing of the first information because the motion for reconsideration of its dismissal did not suspend the finality of the dismissal order. Thus, the period allegedly continued to run and expired before the second information was filed on December 16, 1974.

ISSUE

Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an order dismissing a criminal case without prejudice, and before jeopardy attaches, interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for the offense.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of dismissal, and ordered the trial court to proceed with the case. The Court clarified that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information, pursuant to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code. For this interruption to be effective, the subsequent dismissal of the case must be final and beyond reconsideration. The respondent judge erred in holding that the dismissal of the first case on March 14, 1974, was immediately final.
The dismissal was issued upon a motion to quash based on a procedural defect in the preliminary investigation, was made without prejudice, and was rendered before the accused was arraigned or pleaded. Consequently, no jeopardy had attached. Such an interlocutory order of dismissal is not a final judgment of acquittal or conviction. It remains subject to a timely motion for reconsideration or appeal by the prosecution. The filing of the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1974, suspended the finality of the dismissal order. Therefore, the prescriptive period remained legally interrupted from the initial filing of the information on January 24, 1974, until a final resolution of that motion. Since the period was effectively tolled, the filing of the second information on December 16, 1974, was well within the prescriptive period. The respondent judge’s contrary ruling constituted a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.