GR 40502; (November, 1976) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-40502 and L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, et al., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS
Virginia Garcia Fule filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, alleging he was a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, and died in Manila. She was appointed special administratrix. Preciosa B. Garcia, claiming to be the surviving spouse, moved for reconsideration, arguing the CFI of Laguna lacked jurisdiction as the deceased was a resident of Quezon City, not Laguna, and that she should be preferred as administratrix. She later filed a separate petition for administration with the CFI of Rizal. Virginia Fule then filed a supplemental petition in the Laguna case, now alleging the deceased was a former Constitutional Delegate for Laguna, with his last place of residence in Calamba. Preciosa Garcia opposed, contending the supplemental petition could not cure the jurisdictional defect of the original petition.
ISSUE
The primary issues are: (1) Whether the CFI of Laguna validly acquired jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate, hinging on the interpretation of “resides” in the rules on venue; and (2) Whether the appointment of Virginia Fule as special administratrix was proper.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the CFI of Laguna did not acquire jurisdiction. The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court means the place of domicile or permanent residence, not a temporary or occasional place of abode. For purposes of settling the estate of a deceased person, venue lies in the province where the decedent was domiciled at the time of death. The original petition failed to allege the decedent’s domicile, stating only that he was a “property owner of Calamba” and died in Manila. This was insufficient to establish Laguna as the proper venue. A supplemental petition cannot confer jurisdiction retroactively if the court lacked it from the inception due to improper venue. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and cannot be acquired by waiver, agreement, or through a supplemental pleading. Since the deceased was domiciled in Quezon City, the CFI of Rizal was the proper court. Consequently, all proceedings in the Laguna court, including the appointment of the special administratrix, were null and void. On the issue of the special administrator, the Court clarified that while the appointment of a special administrator is discretionary and intended to preserve the estate pending appointment of a regular administrator, such an appointment presupposes a validly commenced proceeding. Since the main proceeding in Laguna was void for improper venue, the ancillary appointment of a special administratrix therein was likewise invalid. The Court emphasized that the preference for a surviving spouse or next of kin in the appointment of a regular administrator does not apply with the same strictness to the appointment of a special administrator, where the court’s primary consideration is the swift preservation of the estate. However, this discretion cannot be exercised by a court without jurisdiction.
