G.R. No. L-40027. January 29, 1976.
WELLINGTON QUE REYES, petitioner, vs. GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Wellington Que Reyes filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus through his sister, alleging he was illegally detained at Camp Crame since January 24, 1975, without any formal complaint, judicial warrant, or specific offense charged against him. The petition, filed on January 25, 1975, named military officials as respondents and asserted the detention was illegal under the new Constitution. This Court issued the writ, requiring the petitioner’s production and an answer from respondents.
The return of the writ claimed the arrest was valid under an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 2530 issued by the Secretary of National Defense. During the hearing on January 29, 1975, the petitioner was presented before the Court. Subsequently, the Solicitor General manifested that the petitioner had been released from detention on the afternoon of January 29, 1975, pursuant to a Temporary Release Order. It was further stated that his case for falsification of a public document had been referred to the Quezon City Fiscal’s Office.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for habeas corpus has been rendered moot and academic by the release of the petitioner from detention.

RULING

Yes, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. The core legal principle is that a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot upon the release of the person under detention, as the writ’s sole purpose is to inquire into the legality of a present restraint on liberty. With the restraint removed, there is no actual substantial relief that the Court can grant. This doctrine was reiterated in the contemporaneous case of Cayaga v. Tangonan.
The Court, however, took the opportunity to clarify the scope of habeas corpus during the period of martial law. It emphasized that while the privilege of the writ may be suspended for persons detained pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, the writ itself is never suspended. Therefore, an application may still be filed, and the courts remain open to provide redress if a detention is shown to be without any legal color or justification, even if ordered by military authorities. The Court noted that the existence of a prior ASO, as asserted by respondents, could provide a basis for detention under martial law authorities. Nonetheless, the petitioner’s release, later made permanent by an order from the Secretary of National Defense, definitively terminated the case. The writ had served its purpose, leaving no live controversy for judicial resolution.