G.R. No. L-39958 May 11, 1978
JESUS D. JUREIDINI, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NAZARIO CLARENCE JUREIDINI, represented by his mother LUZ RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from disputes over the estate of the deceased Nazario S. Jureidini. During the pendency of the petition for review before the Supreme Court, the parties, petitioner Jesus D. Jureidini and private respondent Nazario Clarence Jureidini, executed an Amicable Compromise Agreement dated August 2, 1976. The agreement stipulated that Jesus would pay Nazario Clarence the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00), which was acknowledged as received. In return, Nazario Clarence renounced all his rights, interests, and claims to the estate of the deceased Nazario S. Jureidini. Both parties agreed to waive all claims against each other. The agreement was signed by the parties with the assistance of their respective counsels, including Atty. Luisito S. Villanueva for the private respondent.
Subsequently, the former counsel of record for private respondent, the law firm of Attys. Estanislao A. Fernandez, Arroyo, Acsay, Barin & Ortile and Sisenando Villaluz Law Office, filed a manifestation and motion. They asserted that Atty. Villanueva’s appearance was without their knowledge and consent, and they had no prior inkling of the compromise settlement. They requested time to file a comment and that action on the agreement be held in abeyance. Additionally, a certain Lourdes Cortez filed a petition for intervention, claiming a financial interest based on a prior memorandum of agreement with the private respondent’s mother, Luz Rodriguez, concerning the litigation’s proceeds.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) Whether the rights of lawyers to fees from their client can be invoked to delay the approval of a compromise agreement; and (2) Whether a petition for intervention by an alleged financier can be entertained at this stage and serve as a ground to hold the compromise in abeyance.

RULING

The Supreme Court approved the Amicable Compromise Agreement and denied the motions to hold it in abeyance. On the first issue, the Court ruled that the matter of attorney’s fees due to the former counsel cannot have a standing higher than the rights of the clients themselves. The rights of lawyers to collect fees from their client may not be invoked as a ground for disapproving or delaying the approval of a compromise agreement that is otherwise not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy. Counsel can enforce their rights in the proper court in a separate proceeding, but such rights cannot prevent the approval of the settlement between the parties, as established in Jesalva, et al. vs. Hon. Bautista and Premier Productions, Inc..
On the second issue, the Court denied the petition for intervention. It held that the claim of the intervenor, Lourdes Cortez, could be properly ventilated in a separate proceeding before the proper court. Allowing intervention at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the immediate parties litigant. The Court found the compromise agreement to be not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, and it provided for the full satisfaction of the private respondent’s claim. Consequently, the Court directed the parties to abide by the terms of the agreement and declared the case closed and terminated.