G.R. No. L-39833 February 20, 1976
MICAELA AGGABAO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, THE SPOUSES ROMUALDO ESPADA and DEMETRIA ESPADA, and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Micaela Aggabao filed an appeal from an adverse judgment. After she filed her original record on appeal, the trial court amended its original decision to include an award of attorney’s fees. Consequently, the trial court issued an order dated May 25, 1973, holding in abeyance its action on the approval of the original record on appeal. It directed petitioner to incorporate the amendatory order and certain objections into an amended record on appeal and then set it for hearing. This order did not specify a fixed period for compliance. When no amended record was filed after over a month, the trial court issued another order on July 31, 1973, granting petitioner a final fixed period of twenty days from notice to file the amended record. Petitioner complied within this 20-day period.
However, private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal, citing Rule 41, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. They argued that since the May 25 order did not fix a time, the rule supplied a ten-day period, which had already lapsed by the time the court issued its July 31 order granting a 20-day extension. The trial court and subsequently the Court of Appeals agreed, dismissing the appeal on the ground that the trial court lost jurisdiction to grant an extension after the suppletory ten-day period expired.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the appeal, thereby denying the petitioner’s right to appeal.

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court reversed its decision and ordered the trial court to approve the amended record on appeal. The legal logic centers on the proper application of Rule 41, Section 7. The provision’s ten-day period applies only “if no time is fixed in the order.” The Court held that the trial court’s May 25, 1973 order, by holding resolution in abeyance and requiring further steps like setting a hearing, effectively granted an indefinite reasonable period for compliance, not the suppletory ten days. This interpretation is supported by the parties’ conduct: respondents raised no objection to the indefinite period, filed no motion to dismiss after the ten-day period lapsed, and did not oppose the court’s July 31 order granting a final 20-day extension.
Crucially, the trial court retained control over the proceedings and had the authority to clarify and set a definitive period, which it did through the July 31 order. Since petitioner complied within this lawfully granted extension, her appeal was timely perfected. The lower courts’ rigid application of the ten-day period, under these specific circumstances, constituted a grave error that unjustly forfeited the petitioner’s right to appeal. The writ of mandamus is proper to compel the giving of due course to the appeal.