G.R. No. L-39832 January 30, 1976
ILUMINADA T. TORREDA, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO R. BONCAROS, Judge CFI NEGROS ORIENTAL, BRANCH V; VISAYAN SAWMILL, INC., ANG TAY, and SERAPION TIONSON, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Iluminada Torreda filed a civil action for damages arising from the death of her husband, Pascasio Torreda, in a motor vehicle incident on July 25, 1963. The complaint alleged that the driver, Serapion Tionson, an employee of Visayan Sawmill, Inc. and Ang Tay, negligently operated a cargo truck loaded with improperly secured lumber. While driving at night, protruding lumber from this truck struck and killed Pascasio, who was a passenger in an oncoming vehicle. A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed in 1968, but the accused driver subsequently jumped bail and fled abroad, stalling the criminal proceedings. On December 15, 1972, petitioner filed this independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
The respondents moved to dismiss the civil case, arguing it had prescribed. The respondent court granted the motion, ruling that the four-year prescriptive period for quasi-delicts commenced from the date of the incident in 1963. The court held that the filing of the criminal case in 1968 did not interrupt the prescriptive period for the separate civil action based on culpa aquiliana. It also noted that a notice to reserve the filing of a separate civil action, filed by the petitioner in August 1972, was ineffective as the prescriptive period had already lapsed.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the civil case on the ground of prescription.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the dismissal orders, and ordered the reinstatement of the civil case for trial. The Court recognized that, from a technical standpoint, the action based on quasi-delict could indeed have prescribed, as the four-year period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code began from the negligent act in 1963, and the civil suit was filed in 1972. An action for quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from the crime under the Penal Code, as expressly provided in Article 2177.
However, the Court applied rules of procedure to achieve substantial justice. It noted that the defense of prescription was not raised in the respondents’ original motion to dismiss filed in February 1973. This defense was invoked for the first time only in a supplemental motion filed over six months later, in September 1973. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed waived. The respondents provided no justification for this belated invocation. Given these peculiar circumstances, where the petitioner would be left without any remedy, the Court held that the ends of justice would be better served by applying the general rule on waiver of defenses. Equity and substantial justice prevailed over a strict technical application of the prescriptive period.