GR 38984; (November, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 38984 November 24, 1989
MACARIO EMBUSCADO Y DAYUNOT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Macario Embuscado was a tenant on an agricultural land owned by Prima Macasongsong Vda. de Acapulco since 1958, receiving a one-third share of harvested coconuts and mangoes. On May 22, 1973, he harvested 320 mangoes from the land without the knowledge and consent of his landlord and subsequently sold them. Before he could collect the payment, he was apprehended. An information was filed with the City Court of Ozamiz City charging him with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 4(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The City Court found him guilty and sentenced him to two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge Geronimo R. Marave, convicted Embuscado not of estafa but of the crime of theft, imposing a higher penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor. Embuscado’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for review. He argued that his conviction for a crime not charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation and to due process.
ISSUE
Whether the appellate court (Court of First Instance) erred in convicting the petitioner of theft when he was originally charged and tried for estafa.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance and reinstated the City Court’s judgment, with a modification on the penalty. The Court held that theft is not included in the crime of estafa as charged. The information specifically alleged estafa under Article 315, paragraph 4(1)(b), which pertains to misappropriation or conversion of goods received in trust or on commission. Convicting an accused of an offense not included in the crime charged constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, violating due process. The legal logic is grounded in the principle that an accused can only be convicted of the crime charged or of a lesser offense necessarily included therein. Theft and estafa are distinct crimes with different elements; theft involves taking personal property without consent, while estafa under the cited provision involves abuse of confidence. Since theft is not an element of nor included in the estafa charged, the conviction for theft was invalid. The proper course was to affirm the estafa conviction. The penalty was recalculated to three months and eleven days of arresto mayor, within the medium period, as no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present.