GR 38984; (November, 1989) (Digest)
G.R. No. 38984 November 24, 1989
MACARIO EMBUSCADO Y DAYUNOT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Macario Embuscado was a tenant on an agricultural land owned by Prima Macasongsong Vda. de Acapulco since 1958, entitled to a one-third share of the harvest. On May 22, 1973, he harvested 320 mangoes from the land without the knowledge and consent of the landowner and subsequently sold them. Before he could collect the payment, he was apprehended. An information was filed with the City Court of Ozamiz City charging him with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The City Court found him guilty of estafa and sentenced him to 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Misamis Occidental modified the conviction. The CFI found petitioner guilty not of estafa, but of the crime of theft, sentencing him to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting this petition for review, wherein he argued that his conviction for a crime not charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation and to due process.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in convicting the petitioner of the crime of theft when the information filed against him specifically charged the crime of estafa.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Court held that the respondent CFI committed a reversible error in convicting the accused of theft. The legal principle is clear: an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not included in the crime charged in the information, as this constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The crime of theft is not included in the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements and nature of the two crimes are distinct; estafa under that specific provision requires the receipt of property in trust or on commission, which was not the factual scenario established. The CFI’s action therefore deprived the petitioner of due process.
Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the CFI decision. The Court reinstated the judgment of the City Court convicting the petitioner of estafa, but modified the penalty. Applying the prescribed penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty was recalculated to 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor. The dissenting opinion argued that the case involved an agrarian dispute falling under the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations and that the facts did not constitute estafa, but this view did not prevail.