G.R. No. L-38317 September 22, 1976
MARCELINO ARNADO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE-CEBU, BRANCH IX, MARCELA ARROGANCIA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Marcelino Arnado (later represented by his heirs) filed an action against his mother, Marcela Arrogancia, in 1956 for the possession and ownership of a parcel of land in Tabuelan, Cebu. The Court of First Instance dismissed his complaint, declared Marcela the sole owner, and ordered Marcelino to pay attorney’s fees. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1965 and was duly executed thereafter, closing the case.
In 1972, the private respondents (Marcela’s successors) filed a motion in the same concluded case for an alias writ of execution. They alleged that Marcelino’s wife had entered the property and built a house, refusing to vacate. Acting on this motion, the respondent court issued an order in 1973 directing the deputy sheriff to turn over physical possession to the respondents and to remove or demolish the house built by the petitioners.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted without jurisdiction in issuing the 1973 order for demolition and execution.

RULING

Yes, the respondent court acted without jurisdiction. The order is patently null and void. The core legal logic rests on two fundamental principles: finality of judgment and the proper mode of execution. First, the original 1965 judgment in the ownership case between Marcelino and Marcela had been fully executed, rendering the case a closed file. The subsequent intrusion by Marcelino’s wife was a new and separate factual occurrence, alien to the issues already litigated. Ordering the demolition of her house without giving her an opportunity to be heard in a proper proceeding violated basic due process.
Second, the order was issued procedurally out of time. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may be executed by motion within five years from its finality. After the lapse of that period and before the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations, it can only be enforced by instituting a separate and independent action. The 1973 order was issued eight years after the 1965 judgment became final and executory. The private respondents’ proper remedy was to file a new action, not to seek an alias writ in a long-closed case. This procedural defect alone deprived the court of jurisdiction to issue the enforcement order. Furthermore, the court noted that Marcela Arrogancia had since died, making the petitioners co-owners of the property and thus not subject to summary eviction. The petition was granted, and the 1973 order was annulled and set aside.