GR 37271; (June, 1980) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-37271. June 25, 1980.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ROMIE V. BRAGA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, petitioner, vs. HON. MAGNO B. PABLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, Branch XIII, ROGELIO CARACE, GODOFREDO CARACE, GIL CASTRENCE, ROGELIO CARANZA and DAMIAN SENIT, respondents.
FACTS
The accused were charged with Homicide. After several hearings where the prosecution presented multiple witnesses, the trial was set for July 17, 1973. On that date, the prosecution moved for postponement because its final and vital witness, Dr. Francisco Q. Duque, who would testify on the cause of death, was absent. The trial judge, respondent Magno B. Pablo, denied the motion and ordered the prosecution to proceed. The prosecution filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. The prosecution then orally requested a ten-day period to elevate the matter to the appellate court via certiorari. The judge verbally granted this request, stating, “Alright, you can do that.”
Despite this grant, on the very same afternoon, the defense filed a “Motion to Consider Prosecution’s Case Rested and Motion to Dismiss.” The judge immediately granted the motion in an order dated July 17, 1973, acquitting all accused for failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution promptly filed an opposition the next day, but the judge subsequently amended his July 17 order to change “acquittal” to “dismissal.” The prosecution’s motions for reconsideration and clarification were denied.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal case after having granted the prosecution time to seek appellate review of the denial of its motion for postponement.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and mandamus, setting aside the dismissal order. The Court found a clear grave abuse of discretion. The judge’s verbal grant of a ten-day period for the prosecution to seek certiorari was unequivocal, as shown by the transcript. His subsequent act of dismissing the case on the same day, without waiting for the granted period to lapse and without allowing the prosecution to file an opposition, was arbitrary and capricious. This erratic action violated fundamental fairness and due process.
The Court held there is no inconsistency between denying a motion for postponement and allowing that denial to be tested by a higher court. A judge who refuses to have his interlocutory orders reviewed where abuse is alleged acts tyrannically. The principle of double jeopardy does not bar the reinstatement of the case. The judge’s act constituted a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy from attaching. Furthermore, the dismissal was not based on the merits but was a procedural termination that cut short the prosecution’s right to complete its evidence and to seek appellate recourse as had been permitted. The case was ordered reinstated for further proceedings, with the prosecution given reasonable opportunity to present its remaining evidence.
