GR 35612 14; (June, 1973) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-35612-14 June 27, 1973
NORBERTO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, GUMACA BRANCH, PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUAN MONTECILLO, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF QUEZON PROVINCE, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Norberto Mendoza, along with others, was charged with murder. Initially, a single information for triple murder was filed. The municipal court of Mulanay granted him bail. However, this Court, in a related case (Unal v. People), required the filing of three separate amended informations for the three victims. Subsequently, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, upon motion by the prosecution, cancelled the bail previously granted. Mendoza filed petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus, which were dismissed by this Court in a resolution dated January 26, 1973. He now seeks reconsideration, arguing his detention is illegal and the cancellation of his bail constituted grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
The primary issues are: (1) whether a writ of habeas corpus is available to petitioner; and (2) whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling his bail and requiring a new bail hearing.
RULING
The petition for reconsideration is denied. The writ of habeas corpus is not available. Habeas corpus secures release from illegal detention. Petitioner’s confinement is pursuant to a valid warrant of arrest issued after a judge’s examination of the complainant and witnesses, as constitutionally required. There is no allegation that this warrant was illegally issued. His co-accused previously challenged the form of the information, not the legality of the arrest warrants. Thus, his detention is lawful, and habeas corpus will not lie.
On the issue of bail, the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in cancelling the bail and ordering a new hearing. The right to bail before conviction is fundamental, except for capital offenses where evidence of guilt is strong. However, two fatal defects attended the initial grant of bail by the municipal court. First, under the doctrine in Feliciano v. Pasicolan, bail can only be granted to one who is in the custody of the law. Petitioner was at large when bail was granted, making the order incongruous and invalid. Second, the prosecution was not afforded an opportunity to present evidence on whether the proof of guilt was strong, a procedural right to which it is entitled. The subsequent filing of three separate amended informations created a new procedural context, allowing the prosecution to alter its position and formally oppose bail. The respondent court acted correctly in setting aside the prior bail order and requiring a proper hearing where the prosecution can present its evidence. The cancellation was a procedural rectification, not an abuse of discretion. The Court’s previous minute resolution of dismissal, which succinctly addressed the lack of merit, suffices under constitutional requirements.